Goldsmith at Chilcot: morning session

Read a summary of our live tweets during the morning from the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war, as former attorney general Lord Goldsmith gives evidence.

• 9:40 AM: channel4news Ahead of Lord Goldsmith's appearance at the #iraqinquiry, our Chilcot blogger has penned a scene-setter: bit.ly
• 9:55 AM: IraqInquiryBlog [Fyi - cross fingers all will be fine but if this Twitter acct drops out during the course of the day we'll switch to bit.ly]
• 10:03 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Here we go. Smart dark suit, spotted claret tie - looks (uncontroversially) very lawyerly
• 10:04 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert opens by asking about the legal basis for coalition No Fly Zones over N and S Iraq from the end of Gulf War 1 in 1991
• 10:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith says his predecessor Lord Williams had green-lighted the NFZs.. He himself was asked in 2002 about legality of hitting targets
• 10:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog like radar positions if they locked onto Coalition aircraft policing the NFZs
• 10:06 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: We wanted MoD updates on whether targets had been attacked and if, I'm afraid the phrase is, if 'collateral damage' had occurred
• 10:07 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: There were detailed things we didn't attack; places of worship, Red Cross and so forth. It was about assessing risk to civilians
• 10:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Occasiona;lly we even summons MoD people to explain reports of civilian damage or casualties - we took that very seriously
• 10:09 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: We were often shown aerial photos, we were told the intel about what the target was - I would sometimes suggest using smaller
• 10:09 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: missiles or attacking at night, which the MoD didn't like
• 10:11 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: In April 2002 FCO legal advisers sent me paper describing the 'revival' authority for using old UNSCRs to justify military action
• 10:11 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I didn't just take this for granted; I asked for FCO briefing, looked at previous legal advices & concluded if UNSCR 687 was
• 10:12 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: breached that was an authority for the use of force.
• 10:13 AM: channel4news Government measures to freeze the assets of people suspected of terrorist involvement have been overturned - Supreme Court.
• 10:13 AM: channel4news London mayor Boris Johnson is to stand down as chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority - sources.
• 10:13 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: We had advice from the UN legal adviser that the UNSC would have to determine whether there'd been a breach & force could be used
• 10:14 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: We didn't regularly get JIC intelligence assessments - I have a bit of an issue with this - but I did get JIC briefings on Iraq
• 10:15 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I didn't know about the (Sept 02) dossier - didn't see it til it came out, didn't really know what the purpose was
• 10:16 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: The agreed UN causes for the use of force: self-defence, humanitarian crisis and UN authority
• 10:17 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: In Summer 2002 press were reporting US doctrine of pre-emption, something different from anticipatory self-defence
• 10:18 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I didn't agree with the US reports so I asked for JIC briefing about the WMD threat Iraq actually posed - met John Scarlett
• 10:19 AM: channel4news Lord Goldsmith arrives at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre before giving evidence to the Chilcot inquiry.
• 10:19 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: My judgment after briefing was that there wasn't evidence of imminent threat to justify attacks on the grounds of self-defence
• 10:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I wasn't aware of discussions about poss military action in first half of '02 - I didn't attend Cabinet, but I read press reports
• 10:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I wrote to Geoff Hoon on 28/3/02 about a Dimbleby interview he did where he repeatedly said there was a clear basis for military
• 10:23 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: action without further UN authority. I wrote to tell him that I was unhappy that. He replied - am I allowed to refer to this?
• 10:25 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I want 2 make it very clear I don't agree with the decision that has apparently been taken not 2 release some documents 2 Inquiry
• 10:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith attends 23/7/02 Downing ST meeting at which he sais self-defence/humanitarian grounds were no basis for use of force and that
• 10:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog self-defence justification would be 'difficult' to argue #Iraq
• 10:29 AM: IraqInquiryBlog justifying action on grounds of previous resolutions would be 'difficult' to argue #Iraq
• 10:30 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith is asked why his legal advice to Blair wasn't welcome. Goldsmith: You'll have to ask Tony Blair that.
• 10:31 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith says letter Daily Mail claim to have between him and Blair doesn't exist - I've no idea what they've got, if they've got anything
• 10:32 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I met David Manning & Baroness Morgan on 14 Oct 02 to say a new resolution would be needed to establish material breach
• 10:32 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I also told them that regime change in and of itself was not a lawful basis for the use of force #Iraq
• 10:33 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I called Foreign Sec Jack Straw on 18/10 - I was concerned to tell him without being able to examine drafts of a new resolution
• 10:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: it didn't look to me as though the current draft was going to be enough to justify military action
• 10:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Saw it as my job to reach a correct legal view - I also had concerns about public statements being made, like with Hoon, lest
• 10:35 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: that be seen to be our official position. But I do realise ministers had a difficult job keeping pressure up on Saddam Hussein
• 10:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: 'I wasn't included in meetings in a sense at all': wasn't asked 2 provide advice in writing at this stage, didn't feel I needed 2
• 10:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Didn't feel I needed to say anything more about basis for action - it was accepted self-defence/humanitarian grounds didn't work
• 10:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Met PM on 02/10/02 to discuss situation. Issues of regime change and Kosovo precedent cropped up #Iraq
• 10:40 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: One question we discussed was whether an 'unreasonable veto' at the UNSC could be ignored - I'm afraid you cannot
• 10:41 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Before UNSCR 1441 my view was there were those 3 bases for use of force: self-defence, humanitarian & UN Authority
• 10:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Before 1441 the first two didn't apply but that on UN Authority I agreed 'revival' cd justify action in principal, w/ a new UNSCR
• 10:45 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: In context of UNSC it didn't seem to be our practice to involve the Attorney General or ask him to give advice
• 10:46 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: FCO would say 1441 came under my eye because they'd tell us about the negotiations, if they didn't ask for our formal advice
• 10:48 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Arrangements between FCO & my department re 1441 didn't work well enough; I should've been asked 2 be involved more in the detail
• 10:49 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne takes Goldsmith to use of word 'consider' in Par 12 of UNSCR 1441 - did we understand it differently from other UNSCR members?
• 10:50 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Sir Michael Woof [FCO legal adviser] said y'day 1441 was 'clear', I should've thought that was the one thing it wasn't #Iraq
• 10:51 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Have 2 look at whole document, at the purpose behind it. Lyne: US didn't think 'consider' UNSC would have 2 make another decision
• 10:52 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: whereas France thought 'consider' meant they'd ttained their objective of a two stage approach prior to any use of force
• 10:53 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: There were two issues in discussions. If UNSC said Iraq was in material breach, fighter planes could go straight in - but we were
• 10:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: concerned that there not be 'automacity' ie that action would be inevitable - so the 'firebreak' created one last oppo to comply
• 10:55 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith:Should note that French, Russians and Chinese never said "and the UNSC must decide" on use of force. They avoided using the phrase
• 10:56 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: There was a lot that was left unclear by 1441? Goldsmith: It was not crystal-clear, which is why I had to consider interpretations
• 10:56 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: There were elements which pointed in one direction, elements that pointed to another - that's the difficulty
• 10:58 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: This is diplomatic language and there's a lot of code in there - am sure you'll remember that Roderic. Lyne: A very long time ago
• 10:59 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Didn't the failure to reach a crystal clear position mean 1441 deferred resolution of the disagreement for a later stage?
• 11:00 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: 1441 HAD to resolve the situation, either one way or the other.
• 11:00 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: It was clear there had to be a 2nd stage, it was what it consisted of - whether it had to be a further UNSCR
• 11:02 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Which wasn't concluded by 1441. Goldsmith: It was. Lyne: If unclear it can't have been concluded. Goldsmith: With respect it is not
• 11:03 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Recalls French ambassador to UK telling him France DIDN'T require a second resolution
• 11:03 AM: channel4news Question of second UN resolution dogs Goldsmith @ #iraqinquiry RT @IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: It was clear there had to be a 2nd stage...
• 11:04 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Can we at least say the way 1441 came out put UK in difficult position as to whether further UNSC decision or resolution was needed?
• 11:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I think it did - obviously from legal point of view 2nd UNSCR would've meant nobody could then challenge legality of use of force
• 11:07 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: At that stage my provisional view taking all these factors into acct was there wasn't enough there, a 2nd resolution was needed
• 11:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Subsequently, for good reasons I'm sure we'll come onto, I ultimately reached a different definitive view [short break]
• 11:15 AM: IraqInquiryBlog [It's actually rather lonely in the new mega-press room. Small pockets of hacks and occasional tumbleweed. Darned cold, to boot.]
• 11:19 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne asks how Goldsmith's views changed by the time he gave the PM his first March 03 legal advice
• 11:20 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith describes concern at 'Chinese whispers' which misrelated his views on legality (or otherwise) or use of force
• 11:20 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I've heard the expression 'yes but' and the 'but' is forgotten - sometimes you have to shout to ensure the 'but' is remembered
• 11:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Great deal of undergrowth in Whitehall - between departments, advisers press. Lyne: So you picked up the phone to Jonathan Powell
• 11:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Can't remember who called who - but what mattered was the view in No 10. I did say, 'I want this to be understood' and I always
• 11:23 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: got, 'Yes that is understood' - and sometimes you wondered afterwards if everyone was acting accordingly
• 11:23 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Moment came when I'd received this request for advice - came some time in Dec 02 - before then couldn't form a view
• 11:24 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: In a sense it wasn't necessary for me to give advice until it mattered - wouldn't matter until we were at point we had to decide
• 11:24 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: whether to go to war - I hoped it wouldn't come to it but it did
• 11:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: The architecture of 1441 is extremely important - 'material breach' means grounds for other party to terminate a treaty
• 11:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: As I understood it UNSC was saying, after 10 years of trying to get Saddam to comply ANY failure to do so wd be a material breach
• 11:29 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Colloquially UNSC was saying this is the last Straw - no pun intended - I'm sorry I didn't mean a joke by that, far too serious
• 11:30 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I was saying at this stage, please don't take me as being optimistic there won't need to be a further UNSCR later on
• 11:31 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Who formally asked for legal advice in Dec 02? Goldsmith: Request came in FCO legl adviser letter setting out pro-& anti- arguments
• 11:33 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: My officials then prepared a covering note analysing what the FCO letter set out. I told Powell I was concerned about the
• 11:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: assessments referred to so it was agreed I would meet Jeremy Greenstock and the US negotiators to get arguments for my advice
• 11:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: But Powell then agreed you'd provide formal advice to PM? Goldsmith: No, wasn't request for formal legal advice at that stage
• 11:36 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I wanted to understand what was meant by 'fore assessment' - this was a technique I use with other legal clients
• 11:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Am puzzled why Jonathan Powell should've been the person to discuss these points with. Goldsmith: Wanted to discuss with PM & For Sec,
• 11:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: it was my way of channeling that request. Lyne: So you went to No 10, sought their assistance in moving forward with your advice
• 11:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I don't remember any reuqest for final advice at this stage - it obviously wasn't going to be there and then
• 11:39 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: If wondered if the client [Blair] was concerned that you shouldn't come in too soon with your advice. Goldsmith: Got to ask Blair that
• 11:39 AM: channel4news Sri Lanka election: President Mahinda Rajapaksa wins as rival's hotel is surrounded by troops. bit.ly #srilanka #tamil
• 11:40 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: It was agreed I'd provide a draft advice so I could raise questions which were causing me concern #Iraq
• 11:40 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: When did you give the PM your first advice? Goldsmith: My advice remained preliminary until Feb, I was still researching it
• 11:41 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: On 27 Feb 02 I met PMs advisers in No 10 & told them following my trip to US, Greenstock meeting, a reasonable case could be made
• 11:42 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Wilmshurst said she unofficially saw draft advice you gave the PM in Jan. Goldsmith: She wasn't involved.
• 11:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I presented a sort of draft proviional advice as a a basis for understanding their response to my concerns
• 11:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I discussed it briefly with the PM at this stage. I do recall Blair saying, I do understand that your advice is your advice - ie
• 11:44 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: that it was for me to reach a judgment, and that he had to accept it
• 11:46 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne:: Who else saw the document besides PM? Goldsmith: No 10 sent it to Greenstock and Straw, Straw wrote to me later with his comment
• 11:47 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Moving now to when you met Greenstock - 23/1/03. What was that for? Goldsmith: to get first-hand from our main UN negotiator his
• 11:48 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: observations on the negotiatingn history, the textual arguments re 1441 and so on
• 11:49 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Did Greenstock tell you French, Germans etc specifically wanted the UNSC to finally approve any use of force?
• 11:50 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: He went further - said French & Russians had lost in negotiations; US conceded to a UNSC discussion, but no need for resolution
• 11:52 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: French & Russians said they still thought there should be a two-stage approach. Goldsmith: There WAS: but a discussion, not a decision
• 11:53 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: If this were all crystal-clear we wouldn't be in the position we are today; some might say it's a commentary on the UN system
• 11:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: that we end up on such an important issue debating the meaning of two or three words, but that's the position.
• 11:55 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith repeats claim that French Ambassador said post-invasion he'd told White House don't go for 2nd resolution, you don't need one
• 11:57 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Ground given in arriving at UNSCR1441 was to concede some second stage - difficult Q was whether 2nd stage was going to be a
• 11:58 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Council discussion or a Council decision
• 11:59 AM: channel4news #Haiti quake: doubts over whether a man survived two weeks under rubble and actor Sean Penn visits emergency camps: bit.ly
• 12:00 PM: IraqInquiryBlog [Goldsmith details some very complicated resolution preambles - is it any wonder 1441 ended up so unclear?]
• 12:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: So this is brilliant diplomatic compromise from which both sides can emerge effectively restating their own positions...
• 12:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: US didn't believe they needed a UNSCR at all - they believed they were able to determine that Iraq was breaching obligations
• 12:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: US could have walked away from 1441, could've said 'We can now take force'
• 12:05 PM: IraqInquiryBlog [Phew - another short break. Got all that?]
• 12:17 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: After meeting Greenstock did you report to PM? Goldsmith: I did - he'd made some good points, made headway, but he hadn't got me there
• 12:18 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: My provisional view at that stage was still that 1441 didn't authorise force without a further UNSC determination
• 12:18 PM: channel4news #Iraq inquiry: UN route "not terribly welcome" and "you'll have to ask Mr Blair that" says Lord Goldsmith: bit.ly
• 12:19 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: We - I and the FCO advisers - agreed that the principle of reviving old UNSCRs existed - but not what would happen after a breach
• 12:21 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: We know FCO legal advisers consistently said a 2nd resolution was necessary, and that was your provisional view until Feb 03?
• 12:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith says he didn't receive any further legal minutes from FCO's Michael Wood, and didn't actually deal with Wilmshurst at all
• 12:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I didn't like Jack Straw's rebuke to Michael Wood for expressing his legal view (which said a 2nd resolution was required)
• 12:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I've always maintained that legal advisers need to tell ministers what they need to hear, not what they want to hear
• 12:24 PM: channel4news RT @cathynewman: Best gag from harriet harman at pmqs: says tories' reversing even worse than hers!
• 12:24 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Job of legal advisers to advise Govt what int'l law requires of them: the difficulty sometimes may be working out what the law is
• 12:25 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Wasn't happy with what Straw did to Wood; I took my role as guardian of advisers seriously & sent him 'slightly rebuking' letter
• 12:27 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Straw replied to you saying the full range of views should be reflected. Goldsmith: advisers must state their advice, although
• 12:28 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: ministers have the right to challenge or test the view
• 12:28 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I paid great attention to FCO legal experts but ultimately I disagreed with the view they took.
• 12:29 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: We didn't disagree about underlyng prinicipal, or about revival - we disagreed about 'the second stage' after an Iraq breach
• 12:30 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Would you having been involved much earlier have helped? Your advice came very late in the day
• 12:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Don't think so. Went some way to make sure people understood what my views might be - I had been involved
• 12:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I twice offered advice when it wasn't asked for (July 2002, Jan 2003) when I thought it necessary I gave advice, asked to or not
• 12:33 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Ipersonally believed the Attorney General should attend Cabinet, not to express views but see context and help keep members on
• 12:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: straight and narrow. I wasn't excluded from the Cabinet, it was simply the practise at the time
• 12:35 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert: I'm puzzled that you weren't involved in legal aspects of drafting 1441? Goldsmith: I did get sent drafts, but not the detail
• 12:36 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I'm quite a hands-on lawyer & if someone said come to NY for a week I would have been happy to do it, but doesn't work like that
• 12:38 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I did have some sympathy with Straw when he complained that legal advisers could be dogmatic about international law
• 12:39 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Lots of other people expressed different reviews about need (or not) for 2nd resolution - every single member of the Labour party
• 12:40 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Did you never speak with Robin Cook or Clare Short about their differing views? Goldsmith: No. They never approached me.
• 12:42 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith describes his Feb visit to Washington - spoke to State Dept officials, briefly Condy Rice, Dept of Defence (sorry, Defense)
• 12:43 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Americans spoke with one voice on this point: they were confident that they hadn't conceded a veto by going along with UNSCR 1441
• 12:44 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Americans were very clear that there wasn't any need for a 2nd resolution, and that the French had acknowledged that
• 12:45 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne asks him what proof he was shown that the French were happy. Goldsmith: I wish they had presented me with more. But I did see some.
• 12:47 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: This wasn't a peripheral matter, it was at the heart of 1441 - you can't interpret legal documents in a vacuum
• 12:48 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Byb the time 1441 is completed it contains lots of clear indicators of use of force - we didn't need to make it any clearer
• 12:48 PM: channel4news #Haiti: The body of a UN worker killed in the earthquake has been identified as Briton Ann Barnes - Foreign Office.
• 12:49 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: So you asked the US - did you ask the French? Goldsmith: I plainly couldn't do that - bad msg it wd've sent to Saddam about our unity
• 12:50 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Couldn't you have spoken to the French privately? Goldsmith: Not sure that's possible. Lyne: What about diplomatic communications?
• 12:50 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: No, that would amount to the same thing.
• 12:51 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: So you are basing your legal advice to the PM on war on accounts about what the French felt, without input from the French
• 12:52 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I also have what Straw told me - not sure it's been declassified but he wrote to me with very clear view about negotiations
• 12:53 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I used a test I frequently do - which side of the argument would you prefer to be on. I took the view I'd prefer to be on the
• 12:53 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: side of the argument which said a second resolution wasn't necessary
• 12:54 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: FCO legal adviser Wood told us if this came before a court it would give v little weight to private conversations
• 12:55 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I certainly didn't read it that way when I heard his evidence.
• 12:57 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: I spent a rather painful 4yrs on the UNSC - difference between various types of conversations and negotations
• 12:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I do understand what you're saying - I note Sir Michael said I was right to try and discover as much as I could re: negotiations
• 12:59 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I did that. Others didn't. I had to look at the words that came from the UN and see what they were intended to mean
• 1:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: You returned to UK on 11 Feb - is it right you changed your advice on 12/2 to say 'reasonable case' could be made that 1441
• 1:02 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: revived the authorisation to use force originally enabled by UNSCR 678? Goldsmith: Yes. I met officials, decided that in the light
• 1:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: of what Straw, Greenstock and the Americans had said to me there is now a reasonable case.
• 1:05 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: I suspect if Chirac was in your chair he'd argue the French had obtained a red line in 1441. Goldsmith: With respect I don't agree
• 1:06 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: We now know the French knew and believed there wasn't the need for a second resolution before use of force
• 1:06 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Mentioning the French makes me think that this is a very good time to break for lunch [alors nous rentrons a 14h00]

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