Operation Tor Shezada: Why insurgents won't fight

Some TV news channels will no doubt present the current Operation Tor Shezada (Black Prince), in southern Afghanistan in the same, ludicrous fashion as they reported Operation Moshtarak earlier in the year in Helmand. Or Operation Panther’s Claw before that.

The story is not about how big or long or fat or noisy the current operation is. Because the current operation is almost irrelevant in its significance.       

Operation Tor Shezada will be completely successful in “clearing” an area because obviously the Americans and British have overwhelming firepower and manpower and can clearly “clear” anything they want whenever they want, with minimal loss of life. Minimal risk, frankly.

But that has as much to do with winning the Afghan war as rearing alpacas in Chile.

Because this war is won or lost by holding territory – by eliminating the resistance from local people permanently  – so as to allow the writ of the Kabul government to re-establish itself.

Well that is the theory. In practice this aim – the only way to win the war – has not been achieved.

If anything, matters are going the other way, 9 years into this.

In practice, NATO does not have the manpower, the Afghan Army does not have the know-how (or the language in Pashtun areas) and everyone pretty much either hates or distrusts the Afghan police and with good reason.

Which is why Operation Moshtarak’s progress has been pitifully slow and very bloody and has yet to achieve its aims.

Because the foreign soldiers will soon have to withdraw. The Taliban/insurgents/resistance – choose your own name — will then re-establish themselves. Redeploy into safe houses. Replant their IEDs .

Re-establish their safe firing points. Redesign their sniper positions and ambush zones.

And the war will begin again as if the initial push had scarcely happened. And the British and American forces will again be dealing with this and with a people whose motives they do not understand; whose language they do not speak; whose culture is completely alien.

And if you are trying to fight a counter-insurgency war on those terms you are perilously close to fighting it on the terms of the insurgents.

They will not meet you head on as you go in on whatever new Pashtun-named Operation it is this week. They will not be there. They will have moved out. To wait for another day.

They have the one weapon NATO craves but sees evaporating before its very eyes: time.