![HOPE not hate]

From voting to violence?
Far right extremism in Britain

Dr Matthew Goodwin and Professor Jocelyn Evans

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HOPE not hate

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Foreword

A timely warning

At the beginning of the year the Home Affairs Select Committee published *The Roots of Violent Radicalisation* as a response to the changing Home Office Prevent strategy. The report concluded that far right extremism and violence was too often ignored and more research was required.

From Voting to Violence? Exploring right-wing extremism in modern Britain is a large step in filling the knowledge gap. It is both fascinating and insightful. It adds to our understanding about the motivation and views of those who support extreme and radical right-wing organisations.

The report graphically highlights the central dominance of immigration and a fear of Islam to supporters of both the British National Party (BNP) and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). This is despite the leadership of both organisations playing down their hardline views. While there might be differences in the intensity of this animosity between BNP and UKIP supporters, hostility to immigration and Muslims is linked to a wider discontent with British democracy and distrust towards those who represent it.

The report clearly shows distinct variations of attitudes between different types of supporters, with those actively involved in extreme right wing organisations having more hardline views and attitudes to violence than those who merely vote for such groups or those who are potential supporters. Whether the more hardline views explain why people actually join right wing organisations, as opposed to simply voting for them, or being involved politicises people is beyond the scope of this research, however the differences are interesting in themselves.

One of the most worrying aspects of this research is the attitude of BNP, UKIP and English Defence League (EDL) supporters to violence. There is a widespread belief that conflict between ethnic, racial and religious communities is inevitable and a frighteningly large number of respondents appear willing to engage in violence to protect their group from threats. Half of BNP supporters said that preparing for conflict was "always" or "sometimes" justifiable, with 21% saying that it was "always" justifiable.

For most, these attitudes to violence do not go beyond their private thoughts but for a few it does. The Home Affairs Select Committee report noted that there were currently 17 far right activists in British prisons for terror-related offences. We are also witnessing an increase in violence from supporters of the EDL around the country.

HOPE not hate has repeatedly voiced its concern at the failure of the authorities to understand the link between right wing rhetoric and violence. Surely, when a political party repeatedly talks of racial conflict and the threat of Islam in apocalyptical terms this will inspire some of its supporters to take more violent action. They might act alone but they have been inspired by more mainstream right wing ideology.

From Voting to Violence? Exploring right-wing extremism in modern Britain should be essential reading for anyone who is engaged with countering and limiting the impact of right wing extremism. which in turn will help us counter them.

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Executive Summary

Compared to other forms of extremism, the evidence base on far right extremism is lacking. In the aftermath of the attacks in Norway, and ongoing support for far right parties across Europe, it has become clear that we know little about the citizens who, in various ways, express support for far right extremism. Despite generating considerable interest, their social profile, attitudes and views towards violence and armed conflict remain poorly understood.

Before summarising key findings, it is important to stress that the research presented in this report is exploratory in nature. This means that, while objective and shedding significant light on a sample of far right supporters, it is not a definitive assessment. Any conclusions that are drawn or interpreted should be treated with caution, particularly with regard to representativeness of the wider groups of supporters. In this case, our sample has not been controlled for any demographic profile, and may contain bias associated with internet surveys of this nature. The study is based on a survey of 2,152 individuals, but we cannot claim that they necessarily reflect the views or official positions of the movements with which these individuals are linked.

The aims behind this study were three-fold. First, unlike many other surveys that ask standard questions, we wanted to ask supporters targeted questions about issues and beliefs that may be prominent within the far right, but which are rarely explored. Aside from their views towards issues like immigration and Islam, we wanted to begin pushing the evidence base forward by probing the views of far right supporters towards violence and armed conflict.

Second, we wanted to compare and contrast supporters of different movements to the Right of the centre-right Conservatives. Not all movements that occupy the far right-wing are the same: whereas some, such as the British National Party (BNP), are associated more strongly with ideological extremism, criminality and violence, other movements, such as the more moderate UK Independence Party (UKIP), advocate similar policies in many areas but would strongly reject any association with extremism and violence. Understanding whether, and if so how, their supporters differ may be an important step to understanding what pushes and pulls citizens further along the political spectrum.

Third, rather than assume that far right supporters are identical, we also wanted to delve more deeply by probing whether there are important differences across distinct *types* of supporters, based on their level of commitment. To do this, we compare and contrast five types of supporter to explore whether those at

Executive Summary continued

the core of the extreme right are more hostile in terms of their attitudes, and more supportive of violence, than those on the periphery. These five types of supporter range from the more strongly committed (1) core members, (2) former members and (3) identifiers, through to the less strongly committed and (4) periphery voters and (5) potential supporters.

Key Findings: Who are they?

Who is supporting the far right? Consistent with past research, our sample is dominated by men, who lack university-level education and are generally dissatisfied with their lives. Our findings provide further evidence that both the BNP and UKIP are failing to forge ties with young people, and replenish their ageing bases of support. In both movements, only a minority of supporters are younger than 36 years old. The BNP is a more proletarian party: more than half of its supporters in our sample come from lower social classes, and tend to read tabloid newspapers or no newspaper at all. In contrast, UKIP appears to be appealing more strongly to professionals, managers and citizens in non-routine employment, who read broadsheets or tabloids. Interestingly, clear majorities of these supporters say they are non-religious, while our results indicate that significant numbers of the BNP and UKIP supporters in our sample are former members of the armed forces: one out of every five BNP supporter and one out of every four UKIP supporter said they had previously served in the armed forces.

Key Findings: What do they think?

While BNP and UKIP supporters in our sample exhibit distinct profiles, they are driven by a similar set of concerns. Foremost, BNP and UKIP supporters are concerned about immigration. Despite a global financial crisis and economic stagnation, in their eyes immigration is the most important issue facing Britain. Following their second issue of concern (the economy), both groups identify Muslims in British society as the third most important issue facing the country (an option that is not routinely given in standard surveys).

Both groups are deeply sceptical about immigration and its effects, but BNP supporters are the most hostile. They are almost unanimous in their rejection of the notion that Britain is benefitting from diversity. Similarly, there are much stronger levels of agreement among BNP followers on immigrants as the main cause of crime; and that certain racial groups are intellectually superior to others. In one respect, there

is consensus, with both groups endorsing repatriation for immigrants who break the law.

Both groups also express high levels of anxiety over Islam, and its religious institutions. Both BNP and UKIP supporters would feel bothered by the presence of a mosque in their local community, but again to a much higher degree amongst BNP supporters. Such views appear to stem from the way in which large majorities of both the BNP and UKIP supporters view Islam as a serious danger to the West. Over three-quarters of BNP supporters and almost two thirds of UKIP supporters *strongly disagree* that Islam does *not* pose a threat to the West. In fact, less than one out of every ten BNP and UKIP supporter in our sample endorsed the suggestion that Islam does not pose a serious danger to the West. In short, large majorities of both BNP and UKIP supporters appear absolutely convinced that Islam poses a serious danger to the West.

A key difference between supporters of the extreme and radical right-wing is the *intensity* of their feelings about immigration and Islam. BNP supporters in our sample are overwhelmingly concerned about immigration and Muslims, and almost to the exclusion of other issues. BNP followers are the most pessimistic about the impact of immigration on British society, strongly rejecting the suggestion that Britain has benefitted from the arrival of people from different countries and cultures. Also, while the BNP has downplayed its traditional policy of compulsory repatriation, there is strong BNP support in our sample for the idea of sending immigrants back to their country of origin, irrespective of whether or not they break the law.

Within our sample of BNP supporters, it is the party's core foot soldiers, the members and identifiers, who are the most hostile: they disagree the most strongly that Britain has benefitted from immigration; are more favourable towards repatriating immigrants; agree most strongly that immigrants are the main cause of crime in society; and are more likely than periphery supporters to disagree there is no difference in intelligence between black and white citizens. Both BNP and UKIP supporters are considerably dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Britain, and again BNP supporters are the least satisfied, with over half the sample proclaiming themselves very dissatisfied.

Key Findings: Views towards Violence

Large numbers of BNP and UKIP supporters in our sample endorse the view that violence between different ethnic, racial

and religious groups in Britain is largely inevitable, but with much stronger agreement amongst the BNP group.

While we cannot compare these findings with a sample of the national population, they suggest that large majorities of the BNP and UKIP supporters in our sample are expecting relations between different groups to deteriorate into violence. BNP supporters are most likely to consider the strategy of preparing for group conflict justifiable with almost half the sample of BNP supporters considering this *always* or *sometimes* justifiable, compared to less than a third of UKIP supporters. Much greater endorsement of violence never being justifiable is evident amongst UKIP supporters.

Beyond preparing for conflict, we also find evidence of support within the BNP sample for armed conflict, when defending the British way of life, with twice as many BNP supporters as UKIP endorsing this as always or sometimes justifiable. Similarly, twice the proportion of BNP supporters than their UKIP counterparts in our sample agreed violence may be needed to protect their group from threats.

Within the BNP group, there is clear evidence of an inner core of activists who are both expecting, and endorse, violence. By disaggregating supporters into five distinct types, from core to periphery, those at the core of the BNP are far more likely than the more peripheral party's supporters to expect and endorse violence.

It is current and former BNP members who are the most likely in our sample to think that violence may be needed to protect their group, and that inter-group violence is largely inevitable. In contrast, while significant numbers of supporters on the periphery of the extreme right adopt similar views, they are notably less extreme in their views than those who are at the core.

Overall, our results point to the conclusion that the core BNP supporters in our sample share a belief in a forthcoming scenario in which violence will surely occur between their group and 'threatening' other groups, and that under such conditions violence would be an acceptable strategy – a belief that is shared far less widely by the UKIP supporters. Foremost, the BNP members in our sample appear to view themselves as a core vanguard who are preparing for, and are more willing to engage in, a forthcoming inter-group conflict, in a way that on average periphery supporters are not.

Introduction

Who supports the far right, and why? In the aftermath of the atrocities in Norway in July 2011, and amidst ongoing public support for far right parties across Europe, there has arisen a consensus that our current knowledge on far right extremism is lacking. This is especially true when this research is set alongside the rapidly growing body of evidence on religious-based forms of extremism, which have most attention.[1] Citizens who shift behind the far right are often dismissed as 'ignoramuses and bigots', but reality is we know little about who they are, their attitudes, and views towards violence.[2] As a recent government report pointed out, the traditional view of the far right in Britain is one that 'only pays lip service' to this form of extremism.[3]

Three developments have led to calls to revise this view.

First, across Europe far right parties have become an important and durable force. Though initially dismissed as a flash-in-the-pan, the reality is that socio-economic factors have combined to ensure they are distinctly unlikely to disappear. In established and new democracies, and in the East and West, the modern far right is wielding significant influence. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders is effectively controlling debate. In Sweden, the once abysmal Swedish Democrats (SD) have entered Parliament and are tipped to perform strongly at the next set of European elections. In France, polls predict Marine Le Pen will recruit 15-20% of the vote at elections in April. The most successful of these parties have diversified their electorates and forged ties with a new generation of voters who grew up amidst rising diversity and European integration. This is best reflected in polls in Austria, which suggest that the Freedom Party (FPÖ) is the most popular party among 18-30 year olds.[4]

Marine Le Pen

Second, there have emerged social movements, such as the various Defence Leagues. The birth of the English Defence League (EDL) in 2009, and its current attempt to forge a European Defence League in 2012, signals the arrival of a more provocative brand of far right politics that is attempting to transcend domestic politics.[5] Instead of elections, the EDL pursues a 'march-and-grow' strategy. Instead of formal members, it is recruiting a more fluid coalition of supporters by offering an anti-Islam ticket. There is also evidence that the EDL, or a similar movement, has long-term potential. Recent research suggests the movement is recruiting most heavily among young working class men, who experience unemployment and are deeply anxious about immigration, Islam and settled Muslim communities.[6]

Third, further along the spectrum there have also been prominent cases of right-wing extremist violence. In July 2011, orchestrated attacks by Anders Breivik resulted in the deaths of 77 (mainly young) Norwegians. Then, the discovery of a violent neo-Nazi cell in Germany and murders of two Senegalese street-traders in Italy further underscored the potential for violence from individuals linked to far right networks and ideology. In Britain, almost twenty citizens affiliated to the far right have been imprisoned in recent years for planning or undertaking violence and terrorism.[7] Clearly, not every supporter of the far right is violent, or would endorse violence, but the reality is that we know next to nothing about the views of these supporters towards the necessity of such action.[8]

About the Report

The aim of this exploratory report is to begin to strengthen the evidence base by exploring the backgrounds and attitudes of 2,152 citizens who, in different ways, are supporting the far right. Past attempts to explore these supporters often relied on standard questions about issues or beliefs relevant to the wider population, rather than those that may have greater resonance among a particular subculture.[9]

Furthermore, supporters of the 'far right' have often been lumped together and treated as a uniform group. But the reality is that whereas some movements are associated with a history of extremism, criminality, and violence, other movements distance themselves from these toxic attributes and instead advocate a more 'moderate' style of radical right politics. In British politics these different paths are represented by the more extreme British National Party (BNP), and more moderate UK Independence Party (UKIP). Exploring

Table 1: **Five Concentric Circles of Support**

and comparing citizens who align themselves with these two movements may be an important first step to understanding what pushes and pulls some citizens further along the right-wing spectrum.[10]

While comparing *across* parties, we can also compare *within* them. Not all supporters of a movement are the same. Whereas some become more strongly committed members, others restrict their loyalty to casting a vote, or even considering casting a vote in the future. Exploring different types of supporters, who exhibit different levels of commitment, is an important first step to understanding what might drive citizens from the periphery of a group to becoming a core loyalist. These 'concentric circles' can also be used to explore whether those at the core of extremist groups like the BNP are more hostile in their attitudes towards minorities, and more likely to expect and endorse violence, than those at the periphery of such groups.

Based on their level of affiliation, we separate supporters into five sub-groups: (1) more strongly committed *members*; (2) *former members*, who were previously close to the core[11]; (3) *identifiers* who without prompting align themselves to a movement; (4) *voters* who supported the movement at the last election; and, (5) *potential supporters*, who might consider supporting the movement in the future.[12]

We adopt this approach to explore concentric circles of support for the BNP and UKIP. The EDL, however, cannot be analysed

in this way as it avoids elections and does not have formal membership structures. Meanwhile, other far right parties such as Britain First and the England First Party (EFP), which are often derided by their opponents for having 'more initials than members', are too small to provide sufficient numbers of followers. The raw numbers of respondents for the BNP and UKIP in the survey, broken down by their level of affiliation, are presented below.

Table 2: **Breakdown of our BNP and UKIP sample**

	Number of BNP	Number of UKIP	Number of EDL
Member	54	188	
Former Member	58	123	
Identifier	155	585	
Voter	113	205	
Future Voter	105	404	
Total	**485**	**1,505**	**210**

Across the BNP and UKIP groups, there is a group of 99 individuals who belong to one category of supporter for both parties. Appendix 1 contains details of these individuals. For empirical clarity particularly when we turn to attitudes, we exclude them from our analysis leaving 386 BNP supporters and 1406 UKIP supporters. Throughout the tables, each table reports the total number of respondents by answering the question, the difference from the absolute totals indicating don't knows and missing responses.

1. The Changing Far Right Landscape

I n the first decade of the twenty-first century, it could well be argued that the far right never had it so good. A combination of immigration, terrorist attacks, an expenses scandal and a financial crisis created a perfect storm. Public concern over immigration reached historic levels. Political elites openly questioned the future of multiculturalism. Citizens voiced anxiety over the presence of Islam and Muslims. A large portion of the electorate rejected the suggestion that government was controlling, or being honest about, immigration. Then, a global economic crisis underscored risks to resources. For parties offering anti-immigrant and populist policies, the tides had turned.[13]

Table 1: **Perceived Importance of 'Core' Far Right Issues**

Source: Ipsos MORI Issues Index

The existence of a large reservoir of potential support for the far right was evident at the ballot box. At the 2009 European elections, almost one quarter of the vote, or 3.5 million citizens, shifted behind UKIP or the BNP. Around the same time, academics reached the conclusion that a large portion of the British electorate was profoundly concerned about immigration, backed authoritarian measures and were deeply dissatisfied with the main parties. One such conclusion was that support for the modern far right 'could be 10 or 20 times higher, even if we focus only on those voters who agree strongly with all aspects of the BNP platform'.[14] Aside from the electoral system, the inability of various movements to mobilize this potential has owed much to the way in which the territory to the Right of the Conservatives has become increasingly fragmented. Today, there are three main movements that are competing for this space.

The BNP: Rise and Fall?

Between 2001-2010, the far right landscape was dominated by the BNP. Though founded in 1982 by a former Chairman of the National Front (NF), it was not until the election of Nick Griffin in 1999 that the BNP invested in the ballot box. In only a short time, and adhering to a strategy of 'modernisation', Griffin's BNP left the wilderness to capture over 50 councillors, a seat on the Greater London Assembly and two Members of the European Parliament. In 2009, almost one million voters turned out for the BNP. Then, almost seven million citizens tuned in to watch Griffin on BBC 1's *Question Time*.

But the BNP proved unable to sustain this success. The 2010 General Election saw the number of BNP voters rise to 564,000 but it was insufficient to produce breakthroughs in Barking and Stoke. Not one of the BNP's 338 candidates finished above third place. The result provided fuel to rebels inside the party who had already begun to label Griffin financially corrupt, politically incompetent and toxic. After a failed leadership coup key activists began to abandon politics, or switch to rivals like the English Democrats (ED). But who remains loyal to the extreme right, what are their concerns and, with the ballot box strategy failing to deliver results, what are their views towards alternative actions, such as violence and armed conflict?

UKIP: A Polite Alternative?

Though formed to oppose European integration, since 2001 the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has developed a suite of radical right-wing policies. By 2010, and like the BNP, UKIP was offering a combination of nationalist, xenophobic, Eurosceptic and populist policies. Similar to radical right parties on the continent, UKIP demanded that Britain end mass and 'uncontrolled immigration', though unlike the BNP it proposed a five-year freeze. In addition, there were pledges to regain border control, expel illegal immigrants, remove benefits for remaining immigrants, repeal the Human Rights Act and 'end the active promotion of the doctrine of multiculturalism by local and national government and all publicly funded bodies'.[15] UKIP also played on other radical right themes, calling for an end to political correctness, urging citizens to recognise 'the numerous threats to British identity and culture', advocating a ban on the burqa in public buildings, and inviting Geert Wilders to show his anti-Islam documentary *Fitna* in the House of Lords.

This shift led some academics to suggest that UKIP and the BNP may be drawing on the same well of support and may be 'part of the same phenomenon'.[16] Further evidence is provided

(top) Martyn Gilleard (middle, left) Weapons found at Martyn Gilleard's home

(bottom) Robert Cottage (middle, right) Part of Robert Cottage's stockpile in preparation for the coming "civil war between races"

The EDL: The New Contender?

Founded in June 2009, the EDL has focused on mobilising support around a single issue. The movement claims it is campaigning 'to protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam's encroachment into the lives of non-Muslims', and is firmly opposed to 'the creeping Islamisation of our country'. Unlike the traditional extreme right, the EDL also claims it is recruiting support 'from people of all races, all faiths, all political persuasions, and all lifestyle choices'. The movement is also seeking to cultivate links with similar groups in other countries, which it views as part of 'the global struggle against Islamic intolerance of Western cultures, customs, religions, politics, and laws'.[18]

One survey of an online sample of 1,300 EDL supporters suggests the movement is London-based, and has 25,000-35,000 supporters, most of whom are young men who are deeply pessimistic about their prospects and more likely than average to experience unemployment. Nor does it appear that EDL foot soldiers are driven by a single-issue: while hostile towards Muslims and Islam, they are also anxious about immigration and rising diversity, which explains why their favoured party is the BNP. The three most cited reasons for joining the EDL were to oppose Islam, preserve an identity and express disillusionment with mainstream institutions.[19]

The Violent Fringe: A Serious Threat?

Recent years have also seen several cases of citizens engaging in, or planning, far right extremist violence. The 2010 Prevent strategy identified 17 individuals with links to far right networks, and who had been imprisoned for terrorism-related offences. Examples include Martyn Gilleard, charged with three terrorism offences after being found with homemade nail bombs, weapons, instructions on how to make a bomb and use poison, and Nazi memorabilia, which appeared to stem from his desire to 'save' Britain from 'multi-racial peril'.[20] Neil Lewington was convicted on terrorism charges, after being found with far right literature that outlined the need to use violence 'until all non-British people as defined by blood are removed from our country'.[21] Robert Cottage, a former BNP candidate, was put in custody after stockpiling weapons, in the belief that 'uncontrolled immigration would lead to civil war which would be imminent and inevitable'.[22] But to what extent are these beliefs in a forthcoming and apocalyptic-style 'clash of civilisations' shared by supporters of the extreme right more generally?

in a study of UKIP, which reveals that although the main driver of its support remains Euroscepticism, it has also rallied a working class wing that is deeply hostile towards immigrants, politically dissatisfied and strikingly similar to supporters of the BNP, leading to the conclusion that for a significant section of the electorate UKIP is seen as a 'polite alternative' to the right-wing extremist BNP.[17] But who is supporting UKIP, what are their chief concerns, and to what extent are they distinguishable from those on the extreme right-wing?

2. The Supporters: Who Are They?

Exploring the social profile of supporters is the first step to understanding their motives. Across Europe, research has shown that the far right tends to attract citizens who share a distinct profile. Pessimistic, working class men who lack university education and tend to read tabloid newspapers are often identified as the 'typical' far right supporter.[23] In Britain, past studies have similarly shown how supporters of the BNP tend to be middle-aged or elderly 'angry white men': skilled, semi- or unskilled manual workers, who lack formal qualifications and live in declining industrial towns in the Midlands, North West and outer London, and close to large Muslim communities.[24]

Unlike supporters in the 1970s, modern-day supporters are older, which suggests that 'traditional' far right groups like the BNP may be struggling to replenish their bases of support. Interestingly, this ageing effect does not appear to have extended to the EDL. Though men similarly appear to dominate this new movement, one survey indicates that three-quarters of its followers are younger than 30 years old. It may be that the EDL's more combative style is winning over a new generation of men who are more familiar with unemployment but have not benefitted from higher education, or who feel anxious amidst rising diversity and that the three main parties have nothing to offer them.[25]

The results of our survey paint a similar picture. The sample selected for this study has not been controlled for any demographic profile, and so will contain some bias, but the findings are similar to those above. Firstly, we find further evidence of a clear 'gender gap' within the far right: 72% of UKIP supporters, 70% of BNP supporters and 64% of EDL supporters are men.

Table 1: **Graph on Gender Profile**

%	Male	Female
BNP	70	30
EDL	64	36
UKIP	72	28

Secondly, however, the age profiles of these supporters vary. UKIP supporters are by far the oldest: over two thirds are aged above 55 years old, while less than one out of every ten supporter in our sample is younger than 35 years old. Nor do we find many young BNP supporters: while they tend to be younger than UKIP supporters, most are aged 46-65 years old. Interestingly, they would have first become eligible to vote between 1965 and 1984, a period of history characterised by immigration, campaigns by the extreme right National Front (NF) and a notorious intervention by Enoch Powell. Perhaps,

having been socialised amidst this climate, this particular cohort has retained higher levels of concern over immigration, and today are particularly receptive to the extreme right.[26]

Table 2: **Age of BNP, EDL and UKIP Supporters**

%	BNP	EDL	UKIP
18-25	6	14	2
26-35	13	26	5
36-45	14	14	9
46-55	24	17	19
56-65	29	20	32
Over 65	14	9	34

Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the EDL, and so our sample of 210 current and former EDL supporters should be treated with extreme caution. Yet, it is worth noting that over two fifths of these followers are 18-35 years old, whereas only one out of every ten EDL supporter in our sample is older than 65 (a picture that is generally consistent with the only other survey of EDL supporters). These findings suggest that whereas the radical right UKIP is struggling to connect with recent generations who have grown up amidst European integration, and the BNP is similarly failing to attract a new stable of younger supporters, the EDL may be better positioned over the longer-term.

In terms of education, only few supporters in our sample have benefitted from higher education. Of the three groups, BNP supporters are the least well educated, although few EDL and UKIP supporters in our sample have obtained a university-level education. Only one quarter of EDL and one fifth of UKIP supporters have been to university.

Table 3: **Education Levels of BNP, EDL and UKIP Supporters**

%	BNP	EDL	UKIP
No formal qualifications	14.7	7.4	9.5
Vocational certificate	18.7	20.6	15.6
Intermediate secondary	22.1	12.3	16.9
Final secondary	12.4	18.1	11.3
Tertiary	14.5	24.5	20.2
Other	17.6	17.2	26.6

Turning to **social class**, supporters exhibit a distinct class profile. BNP supporters are the most proletarian, providing evidence that support for the party is driven mainly by semi- and unskilled workers, and citizens dependent on state benefits. In fact, more than half of the BNP supporters in our sample come from the lower social classes. Across Europe, the far

Table 6: **Newspaper readership**

right has proven especially appealing among workers, and in some countries has even emerged as the most popular political option among the working classes.[27] In contrast, UKIP supporters are more likely to be professionals, managers and citizens in routine non-manual employment. While supporters of the EDL in our sample also appear to be most concentrated in professional, managerial and non-manual employment, this smaller sample should be treated with extreme caution.

Table 4: **Class Profile of BNP, EDL and UKIP Followers**

|	BNP	UKIP	EDL
AB: Professional/managerial	20.7	37.0	40.5
C1: Routine non-manual	23.6	26.5	26.7
C2: Skilled manual	23.3	15.9	14.3
DE: Semi-/unskilled manual/residual	32.4	20.7	18.6

Aside from appealing to specific groups, movements like the BNP also seek to galvanise public hostility towards minorities by emphasising Christian themes. But what is the religious affiliation of their supporters? Interestingly, almost half of the BNP and EDL supporters in our sample describe themselves as non-religious.

Table 5: **Religious Affiliation of BNP/EDL/UKIP Supporters**

	BNP	EDL	UKIP
None	46.4	41.8	39.2
Anglican / Episcopal	32.1	27.9	38.5
Roman Catholic	9.1	12.0	8
Methodist	3.4	1.0	2.2
Other nonconformist Christians	3.1	5.8	4.6
Non-Christian religions	0.8	5.8	1.2
Other	5.2	5.8	5.5

Some have also argued that the rise of the far right has owed much to xenophobic reporting in sections of the tabloid media. Clearly, it is extremely difficult to identify the direction of causality relating to these media effects. Yet it is interesting to find notable differences in newspaper readership among our sample of supporters. Whereas UKIP supporters tend to read the *Daily Express*, *Daily Mail* or a broadsheet newspaper like *The Daily Telegraph*, BNP supporters tend to gather their news either from the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express*, or do not read any of the main newspapers. In fact, almost half of BNP supporters in our sample do not read any paper, perhaps because they are gathering news from online sources. There is more of a spread among EDL supporters, who are just as likely to read a broadsheet, the *Daily Express* or *Daily Mail*, or no newspaper.

We also asked supporters whether they had served in the armed forces. The far right often targets the armed forces, while members of the services are often considered more prone to support the far right as a result of their authoritarian tendencies.[28] Indeed, our results suggest there is a significant number of ex-servicemen in the ranks of these movements: one out of every five BNP supporter, and one out of every four UKIP supporter, said they had served in the armed forces. While respondents might also be referring to national service, the results nonetheless suggest that significant numbers of these supporters have had some involvement with the armed forces.

Table 7: **Have you ever been a member of the Armed Forces (%)**

	BNP	UKIP	EDL
YES	19.2	24.7	17.1
NO	80.8	75.3	82.9

Lastly, we wanted to know how satisfied these citizens were with their overall quality of life. Supporters of the far right have been associated with a pessimistic outlook, and so we wanted to explore the extent to which this is also the case within our sample. Asking supporters about the extent to which they are satisfied or dissatisfied with their lives as a whole, our results suggest that BNP supporters are the least satisfied. On a scale of 0-10, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied, the mean position of BNP supporters was 3.6, while for UKIP this was 4.0.

3. Their Attitudes: What Do They Think?

Citizens involved in far right politics are often associated with anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, anti-establishment and authoritarian views. But little is actually known about their attitudes towards various social and political issues, and how these compare.[29] When extreme and radical right-wing parties first exploded onto the scene in the 1980s, many were chiefly concerned with the single-issue of immigration. Yet since then, one of the noted developments has been their shift away from single-issue protest to offering a broad ideological agenda. As part of this process, several parties attempted to diversify and secure their electoral base.

This is no less true in Britain where, in recent years, the extreme right BNP and radical right UKIP sought to widen support by modifying policies. The BNP aimed to transform itself from a neo-Nazi street gang into a respectable extreme right force, by developing a suite of anti-immigrant and populist policies. Meanwhile, UKIP attempted to broaden its single-issue Eurosceptic foundations by investing more seriously in domestic elections and offering a range of radical right-wing policies, such as halting immigration and banning the burqa. But to what extent are these competing visions reflected in the attitudes of their supporters? In this section, we explore the attitudes of BNP and UKIP supporters towards: wider society; immigration; Islam and democracy.

Attitudes towards wider society: Authoritarians?

Considering the demographic profile of BNP and UKIP supporters, there is little evidence of any significant bias in the samples to skew our consideration of relative attitudinal position. The EDL profile, on the other hand, does contain idiosyncrasies which mean we focus more on the other two parties in the following sections. When breaking down attitudes by different levels of supporter, we provide the overall EDL position for information only.

Some of the earliest studies of fascism and right-wing extremism highlighted the crucial importance of authoritarianism to understanding the motives of their followers.[30] These citizens were seen as socially authoritarian towards a range of morality and way of life issues, such as homosexuality. This authoritarian outlook was seen as the foundation for a more specific cluster of attitudes towards race and ethnicity.[31] To probe their outlook, we asked supporters a range of questions that tapped five aspects of authoritarianism: respect; retribution; deference to authority; morality; and self-reliance.

Our findings suggest both BNP and UKIP supporters do indeed exhibit an authoritarian outlook. Large majorities of both groups of supporters in our sample agreed that many aspects of the *status quo* are unhealthy: to the same extent, they think that young people today do not have enough respect for British values. Upwards of 80% of supporters in both groups also back the death penalty, though especially followers of the BNP. As a point of comparison, just over half of the sample in the 2009 British Social Attitudes Survey agreed, strongly or otherwise, with the same question.

Interestingly, however, deference to authority is less widespread: only around half back the notion of the unblinking law-abider, while one quarter are undecided about whether the law should always be obeyed even if it is wrong. This might appear odd, as earlier studies suggested that one of the hallmarks of the 'authoritarian personality' was precisely obedience of authority, including the law, as was high moral

Table 1

	Young people today don't have enough respect for British values		For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence		The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong		Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards		The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves	
	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP
Strongly agree	69.5	60.8	76.0	59.9	16.5	15.0	26.8	23.3	52.2	59.7
Agree	20.3	30.4	11.7	20.6	31.0	35.3	29.7	33.8	24.3	27.7
Neither/nor	6.0	6.3	4.7	5.9	22.6	21.3	15.9	16.8	8.6	6.9
Disagree	3.9	2.2	1.8	6.0	18.1	20.3	14.1	14.7	7.8	3.3
Strongly disagree	0.3	0.3	5.7	7.5	11.8	8.1	13.5	11.4	7.0	2.4
Total	**384**	**1,397**	**384**	**1,393**	**381**	**1,386**	**384**	**1,401**	**383**	**1,403**

probity and rectitude.[32] On the other hand, modern studies have also noted the declining importance of deference. [33]

Also, majorities of the BNP and UKIP favour censorship, demonstrating the continued resistance to libertarian 'encroachment' on strong traditional values. Finally, both sets of supporters bemoan the decline of self-reliance through a nanny state distributing variably justified benefits. In line with other European radical right parties' position on the welfare state as a 'necessary panacea' (French FN), the extent to which welfare is available should be limited, and only to those of direst need – and, we might speculate, correct ethnicity.

Attitudes towards Immigration: The dominant concern

Irrespective of their party choice, in recent years large numbers of British voters have voiced concerns about the level, pace and impact of immigration in wider society.[34] Yet amidst this wide reservoir of public anxiety, the issue of immigration is often considered the *raison d'être* of the extreme and radical right. To explore whether this is the case, we asked BNP and UKIP supporters a range of different questions about immigration, settled Muslims and their impact on wider society.

The findings reveal there are important differences between these supporters, although they are generally united in the fact that their dominant concern is immigration. Even amidst a financial crisis and austerity measures, both groups identify immigration and not the economy as the most pressing issue facing Britain today. In fact, immigration is considered by both groups as the most important problem facing the country: over half of BNP affiliates (52%) and almost two fifths of UKIP affiliates (38%) rated immigration as the most important issue of all.

Unlike standard surveys, we also include in the list of important issues the option of 'Muslims in British society', on the basis that public concern over a settled minority community may be distinct from the issue of immigration *per se*. Over one fifth of BNP supporters (22%) selected this issue as the most important facing the country, though fewer than one in ten UKIP supporters (8%) selected the issue, thus suggesting concerns over settled Muslims are most pronounced with the extreme (rather than radical) right. When seen as a whole, three-quarters (74%) of BNP followers and almost half (46%) of UKIP supporters ranked immigration or Muslims as the most important issues facing Britain today.

However, there is a key difference between these groups, which concerns the *intensity* of their feelings about these issues. BNP supporters in our sample express profound and overwhelming levels of concern about immigration and rising diversity, and almost to the exclusion of other issues. More than seven out of every ten BNP supporter in our sample ranks immigration or Muslims as their dominant concern. In contrast, whereas UKIP supporters select a similar portfolio of issues, their concern over immigration-related issues is less intense, and their preferences are scattered more widely over a range of issues.

3. Their Attitudes: What Do They Think? continued

Table 2: **Attitudes towards Immigration**

	Britain has benefited from the arrival of people from many different countries and cultures		Immigrants who break the law should be sent back to their home country		Immigrants should be sent back to their home country, whether or not they break the law		Immigrants are the main cause of crime in society		There is no difference in intelligence between the average Black Briton and the average White Briton	
	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP
Strongly agree	1.6	4.6	92.4	82.9	46.0	17.6	42.2	15.1	17.1	27.2
Agree	7.0	21.3	5.5	13.1	21.9	17.7	32.0	35.5	19.3	28.4
Neither/nor	9.9	23.6	1.3	1.9	17.2	27.3	17.7	27.6	23.5	22.1
Disagree	23.4	25.5	0.5	1.0	11.2	21.0	5.2	14.8	20.1	15.2
Strongly disagree	58.1	25.1	0.3	1.1	3.7	16.4	2.9	7.0	20.1	7.1
Total	**384**	**1,397**	**384**	**1,401**	**374**	**1,385**	**384**	**1,371**	**374**	**1,329**

To explore these attitudes in greater depth, we then asked a range of questions about immigration: whether Britain has benefited from the arrival of immigrants; whether immigrants who break the law (or regardless of criminality) should be sent back to their country of origin; and whether immigrants are the main cause of crime in society. We also included a question that is designed to gauge support for an older and cruder form of 'biological' racism: whether respondents think there is no difference in levels of intelligence between different racial groups.

The BNP and UKIP supporters in our sample are deeply pessimistic about the impact of immigration, though the BNP group is the most pessimistic: 97% of BNP supporters disagree Britain has benefitted from immigration, compared to 51% of UKIP supporters; 74% of BNP supporters agree immigrants are the main cause of crime in British society, compared to 51% of UKIP supporters; and, lastly, 40% of BNP supporters disagree with the statement that there is no difference in intelligence between black and white citizens, compared to 22% of UKIP supporters.

While anti-immigrant hostility is prominent among both groups, and reaches higher levels than surveys of the national population, it is less pronounced among our sample of UKIP supporters. The notable exception is their attitudes toward immigrants who break the law, where we find a strong consensus among BNP and UKIP supporters that these immigrants should be deported (98% of BNP and 96% of UKIP affiliates endorse this statement). Conversely, when it comes to repatriation irrespective of whether immigrants break the law, UKIP supporters appear far more ambivalent than their BNP counterparts. Though Griffin's BNP has recently downplayed this policy, over two-thirds of the BNP supporters in our sample continue to back the idea of sending immigrants back to their

country of origin, and irrespective of whether or not these immigrants break the law. In fact, only 15% of BNP supporters in our sample disagreed with this idea. Responses from UKIP supporters are markedly different. Only about one third (35%) of UKIP supporters back compulsory repatriation, while around the same figure (37%) reject the proposal outright. Yet it should be noted that over one quarter of UKIP followers remain undecided about the policy, by neither agreeing nor disagreeing, which may well hint at a significant amount of latent support within the party among supporters reluctant to confess their attitudes toward the policy.

Overall, majorities of both groups are deeply sceptical that Britain is benefitting from rising diversity, support returning immigrants who break the law to their country or origin, and endorse the view that immigrants are the main cause of crime in British society.

Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam

What are their attitudes towards Muslims and Islam? At the 2010 general election, the BNP and UKIP pitched to citizens anxious over the role of Islam in society, by pledging to ban the burqa, deport radical preachers and (in the case of the BNP), end immigration from Muslim countries. In our sample, both BNP and UKIP supporters expressed high levels of anxiety over Muslims and the 'threat' from their religion, Islam. Over four fifths of BNP supporters in our sample and over three fifths of UKIP supporters would feel 'bothered a lot' by the construction of a mosque in their community. On the contrary, less than 1% of our BNP sample and 2% of our UKIP sample would welcome a mosque. As a rough comparator, we include the responses to a similar question asked by the British Social Attitudes survey in 2008, which as we might expect reveals that the BNP, and then

UKIP, would feel bothered to a greater extent than average, and are much less indifferent than the population more generally.

Table 3: **Attitudes to construction of a mosque**

Suppose some Muslims wanted to build a Mosque in your community. Is this something which would…			
	BNP	UKIP	BSA National Survey (2008)
Bother you a lot?	82.0	63.8	30.7
Bother you a little?	10.2	19.7	24.2
You would be indifferent	7.0	14.3	38.4
You would welcome a little?	0.3	1.7	5.7
You would welcome a lot?	0.5	0.4	1.0
Total	**384**	**1,394**	**1,130**

We also asked respondents about the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement that Islam *does not* pose a serious danger to the West. Over three quarters of BNP supporters in our sample *strongly disagree* that Islam is not a threatening religion, whereas almost two thirds of UKIP supporters similarly feel strongly that Islam poses a threat to the West. In fact, less than one out of every ten BNP and UKIP supporter in our sample endorse the suggestion that Islam does not pose a threat to the West.

Table 4: **Perceived Threat from Islam**

Statement: Islam does not pose a serious danger to Western civilisation		
	BNP	UKIP
Strongly agree	3.7	2.8
Agree	3.1	5.8
Neither/nor	5.0	6.3
Disagree	11.5	21.9
Strongly disagree	76.6	63.1
Total	**381**	**1,390**

These results would suggest that supporters of the BNP and UKIP are not only deeply concerned about the issue of immigration, but also feel deeply uncomfortable about the perceived threat from Islam, and by extension the presence of its religious institutions at the local level. In short, large majorities in our sample appear absolutely convinced that Islam is threatening Western civilisation.

While asking about these immigration-related issues, we also wanted to get a sense of the surrounding social context in which these supporters reside. Previous studies have linked support for the extreme right-wing to 'threatened white enclaves', mainly white neighbourhoods within more ethnically diverse local authorities.[35] The implication of this finding is that

3. Their Attitudes: What Do They Think? continued

the citizens who are most strongly attracted to the extreme right might also lack contact with members of different ethnic, racial or religious groups, which has been shown to reduce prejudice and bolster tolerance.[36]

We asked respondents about their perceptions of ethnic diversity in the neighbourhood, and whether they had friendships with people from minority backgrounds. Clearly, there are good reasons to expect that supporters may distort reality. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that whereas a clear and overwhelming majority of both BNP and UKIP supporters said there were many or some people from minority ethnic groups in their local neighbourhood, very few of these supporters claimed to have many friends from minority backgrounds. Indeed, over half of the BNP supporters in our sample said they had no friends whatsoever from minority ethnic backgrounds.

Table 5: **Perceptions of Neighbourhood Diversity**

	When thinking about where you live, would you say there are many, some, or no people from ethnic minority groups living in your neighbourhood?		When thinking about your own friendships with people, would you say you have many, some or no friends from ethnic minority backgrounds?	
	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP
Many	36.3	22.1	2.6	5.1
Some	52.3	64.1	40.4	56.2
None	10.1	12.7	55.7	37.8
Don't know	1.3	1.1	1.3	0.9
Total	**386**	**1,406**	**386**	**1,405**

Attitudes towards Democracy

Both the BNP and UKIP have emphasised anti-establishment and populist themes, and presented themselves in opposition to mainstream elites. But what are the attitudes of supporters towards the functioning of democracy, and their levels of trust in political institutions? Consistent with the findings above, it is BNP supporters in our sample who are the least satisfied with the way democracy is working in Britain. In fact, 78% of the BNP supporters express dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is functioning, while over half of these supporters are 'very' dissatisfied. Similarly, 73% of UKIP supporters express dissatisfaction with the way in which democracy is working, though again their feelings are less intense than those among BNP supporters.

Table 6: **Satisfaction with the functioning of British democracy**

On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Britain?		
	BNP	UKIP
Very satisfied	1.9	1.9
Fairly satisfied	18.1	24.0
Fairly dissatisfied	27.1	34.3
Very dissatisfied	52.9	39.8
Total	**376**	**1,389**

We also probed their levels of trust in a range of political institutions. Respondents were asked to indicate their feelings of trust on a scale, that ranged from 0-10, where 0 means no trust in the respective institution and 10 means a great deal of trust. As above, it is BNP supporters who are consistently the least trusting towards Parliament, politicians, political parties, the police and media. With the notable exception of the police, however, both the BNP and UKIP supporters in our sample express a noticeably negative view of the key political institutions in British society.

Table 7: **Trust in Political Institutions**

Now, thinking about British political institutions like Parliament, please use the 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means no trust and 10 means a great deal of trust, to indicate how much trust you have in each of the following. . .		
	BNP	UKIP
Parliament at Westminster	1.6	2.1
Politicians in general	1.3	1.6
Political parties	1.5	1.7
The police	4.1	4.7
The media	1.8	2.6

Lastly, we asked supporters their views toward leaders in British politics, including those on the far right-wing. In this way, and unlike standard surveys, we are able to probe their views toward the perceived competence of leaders outside of the three main parties. The perceived competence of party leaders is important, as it has been shown that voters often use leaders as a shortcut when making their decisions about who to support. As above, respondents were asked to rate leaders on a scale of 0-10, where 0 means the leader is very incompetent, and 10 means they are very competent. The results reveal that the BNP supporters in our sample were the most positive toward BNP Chairman Nick Griffin, followed by EDL leader Tommy Robinson, leader of UKIP, Nigel Farage, and leader of English Democrats Robin Tilbrook. Unsurprisingly, recognition rates of Tilbrook and Robinson were much lower. In contrast,

while BNP supporters were relatively indifferent towards Alex Salmond (SNP), they were the most negative toward Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband, followed by Caroline Lucas and David Cameron. In contrast, UKIP supporters are positive mainly toward their own leader Nigel Farage, and interestingly only ambivalent towards Alex Salmond. They are much less positive, however, toward Nick Griffin and the leaders of the three main parties – although least negative about David Cameron.

1. BNP Chairman Nick Griffin,
2. EDL leader Tommy Robinson,
3. English Democrats leader, Robin Tilbrook
4. UKIP leader, Nigel Farage

Table 8: **Views towards Political Leaders**

Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means a very incompetent leader and 10 means a very competent leader, how would you describe:				
	BNP	**n**	**UKIP**	**n**
David Cameron	2.9	383	3.4	1,400
Ed Miliband	2.0	368	1.9	1,376
Nick Clegg	2.0	380	2.0	1,390
Nigel Farage	4.6	345	7.0	1,355
Nick Griffin	6.5	373	2.7	1,244
Robin Tilbrook	7.3	264	3.6	735
Tommy Robinson	5.2	310	2.8	896
Alex Salmond	3.6	343	4.3	1,261
Caroline Lucas	2.8	310	2.9	1,102

Note: order of list randomised in survey

4. Core versus Periphery: An internal hardcore?

While there is considerable overlap in the concerns of right-wing extremists and right-wing radicals, the previous section also revealed important differences. However, as we have discussed, there are different *levels* of support within the party, and it might be that our approach is also hiding differences *within* the different ranks of these supporters. To explore if this is the case, we now turn to explore whether citizens at the core of these movements exhibit a more authoritarian, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and politically dissatisfied outlook, than those on the periphery.

Rather than present our results in tables of percentages, we will instead use a more comparable 'mean position' for each group.[37] In this way, the tables present the mean position of our five different types of supporters, recoded onto a -2 to +2 scale, where -2 is strongly disagree and +2 is strongly agree. While zero represents a neutral position, the accompanying sign (+/-) represents the direction of agreement or disagreement and the score (e.g. +1/-1) represents the intensity of this agreement or disagreement. On four-point and other non-Likert scales, we leave the scaling as is.

Our results suggest there are important differences across the five types of supporters. Firstly, in terms of authoritarianism, on the whole it is citizens who are closer to the core of these movements who are most likely to endorse several authoritarian items. On several measures, it is BNP members – those closest to the core of the party – who agree most strongly among the group of BNP supporters that young people lack respect for British values. Similarly, it is the BNP members who agree most strongly that capital punishment should be brought back, and that the welfare state has made people less willing to look after themselves.

These core supporters can be contrasted with those on the periphery of the BNP who, while also agreeing with many of these measures, also tend to feel less intensely about them. Interestingly, however, this effect is only evident with regard to some of the items and generally does not apply to the same extent within UKIP, where we find no clearly identifiable pattern. But to what extent are there differences between the core and the periphery with regard to their attitudes to immigration?

Below, we present the mean position of our five types of supporters when responding to a battery of questions about immigration. Again, while BNP supporters more generally exhibit the more hostile views, within this group it is the core supporters of the BNP who are especially hostile. For instance, it is enrolled BNP members and those who actively identify with the party who disagree most strongly with the suggestion that Britain has benefitted from immigration, and it is core supporters (the members and past members) who agree unanimously that immigrants who break the law should be sent back to their home country. Likewise it is core supporters who agree most strongly that immigrants are the main cause of crime in society, and who are more likely than those on the periphery to disagree that there is no difference in intelligence between black and white citizens. Clearly, this pattern is not evident on every question, and is not discernible in the case of UKIP, but is still worth exploring further.

Turning to their attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, and consistent with the findings above, it is core BNP supporters who emerge as the most hostile group, and who are the most likely to consider Islam as a serious danger to the West. Current and former members of the BNP, together with those who

Table 1: **Comparing Core and Periphery Supporters: Authoritarianism**

	Young people today don't have enough respect for British values		*For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence*		*The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong*		*Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards*		*The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves*	
	BNP	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**
Member	1.9	1.4	1.8	1.0	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	1.4	1.5
Former member	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.2	-0.1	0.3	0.4	0.2	1.0	1.4
Identifier	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.4
Voter	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.1	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.2	1.0	1.1
Future voter	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	1.1	1.4
Total	**384**	**1,397**	**384**	**1,393**	**381**	**1,386**	**384**	**1,401**	**383**	**1,403**
EDL	1.1 (206)		0.6 (206)		0.2 (206)		0.5 (206)		0.9 (207)	

Interpreting the results: -2 to +2 scale, -2 = strongly disagree, +2 = strongly agree

Table 2: **Attitudes to Immigration: Core and Periphery**

	Britain has benefited from the arrival of people from many different countries and cultures		Immigrants who break the law should be sent back to their home country		Immigrants should be sent back to their home country, whether or not they break the law		There is no difference in intelligence between the average Black Briton and the average White Briton		Immigrants are the main cause of crime in society	
	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP
Member	-1.7	-0.4	2.0	1.7	1.0	-0.2	-0.7	0.5	1.3	0.2
Former member	-1.3	-0.2	2.0	1.7	0.8	-0.4	0.0	0.5	1.2	0.2
Identifier	-1.5	-0.6	1.9	1.8	1.1	0.2	-0.2	0.5	1.1	0.5
Voter	-1.1	-0.4	1.8	1.7	0.6	-0.1	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.2
Future voter	-0.9	-0.4	1.9	1.8	1.1	-0.1	0.4	0.7	0.9	0.4
Total	**384**	**1,397**	**384**	**1,401**	**383**	**1,385**	**374**	**1,329**	**384**	**1,371**
EDL	0.2 (209)		1.2 (208)		-0.1 (207)		0.5 (204)		0.1 (208)	

-2 to +2 scale, -2 = strongly disagree, +2 = strongly agree

actively identify with the BNP, are the most likely supporters in our sample to feel bothered about a mosque in the local community. In the same way, it is these core BNP supporters who disagree most strongly with the suggestion that Islam is *not* a threatening religion. In fact, BNP members and identifiers are almost unanimous in their rejection of the statement that Islam is *not* threatening the West.

In contrast, though periphery BNP supporters – the voters and potential voters – also feel bothered by the presence of a mosque and disagree that Islam is non-threatening, their feelings are less intense than those at the core of the party. Interestingly, again we do not find the same effect among the ranks of UKIP supporters. On the whole, they would also feel bothered by the presence of a mosque and view Islam as threatening, but there is no clear discernible pattern across the different types of supporter.

Table 3: **Attitudes towards Islam: Core and Periphery**

	Suppose some Muslims wanted to build a Mosque in your community. Is this something which would bother you a lot, bother you a little, something you would welcome a little or welcome a lot?*		Islam does not pose a serious danger to Western civilisation**	
	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP
Member	1.3	1.7	-1.8	-1.4
Former member	1.0	1.4	-1.5	-1.3
Identifier	1.2	1.5	-1.7	-1.4
Voter	1.4	1.7	-1.5	-1.2
Potential voters	1.4	1.6	-1.3	-1.4
Total	**384**	**1,394**	**381**	**1,390**
EDL	2.20 (203)		-0.5 (206)	

*1-5 scale, 1= something that would bother you a lot;
5 = something that you would welcome a lot
**-2 to +2 scale, -2 = strongly disagree, +2 = strongly agree

What are the attitudes of these core and periphery supporters towards democracy in Britain? In terms of their satisfaction with democracy, and as above, we can see that it is core

supporters of the right-wing extremist BNP who are the least satisfied with the functioning of democracy. Whereas periphery BNP supporters are also dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in Britain, they are less so than those at the core of the party. This effect is also evident within the ranks of UKIP, where members emerge as the most strongly dissatisfied among the group of supporters (though not to the same extent as BNP members).

Table 4: **Core and Periphery Attitudes towards Democracy**

On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Britain…?		
	BNP	UKIP
Member	3.7	3.3
Former member	3.5	3.1
Identifier	3.3	3.1
Voter	3.2	3.1
Future voter	3.2	3.0
Total	**376**	**1,389**
EDL	2.6 (204)	

1-4 scale, 1 = very satisfied; 4 = very dissatisfied

5. Views towards Violence: A culture of conflict?

What are the views of these supporters towards violence? Few political parties advocate violence as a strategy. Yet past research suggests some groups on the extreme right do cultivate particular 'narratives' among followers, which characterise minority groups as belligerent, and may justify violence under certain conditions. Based on interviews with activists in the BNP, one study suggests that these more committed supporters tended to subscribe to a specific set of motivational narratives, or *vocabularies of motive*, that were cultivated by the party and its leadership through internal literature. Though few activists openly endorsed violence, many voiced narratives that might legitimate the act of planning for, or engaging in, armed conflict under certain conditions.

These narratives emphasised the way in which a wider group had been thrust into a *survivalist struggle* as a result of immigration and rising diversity, stressed *apocalyptic scenarios* (e.g. a 'clash of civilisations' between Islam and the West), the need to take *urgent and radical action* to save the group from racial extinction; and a *moral obligation* to defend the group, their loved ones and future generations from these threats.[38]

We wanted to explore whether these views were prominent within a larger sample, and if so to what extent. To probe their views towards violence, supporters were asked a battery of questions about their stance towards violence, armed conflict, and where they think society and relationships between different groups are heading in the future. It is extremely difficult to ask valid survey questions about an individuals' own proclivity towards violence, but it is possible to tap general perceptions concerning the perceived inevitability of violence, and the perceived necessity to plan for, or engage in, armed conflict to defend and save a particular group or way of life. Crucial in this respect are the concentric circles of supporters, which allow us to explore whether it is the case that citizens who are closer to the core of the extreme right exhibit different views from those on the periphery.

Conflict and Violence: General Views

We asked supporters about their views towards various statements concerning relations between different groups, and how these are likely to develop. These statements tapped the extent to which supporters agree or disagree that relationships between different groups will worsen, there will be a 'clash of civilizations', that violence will be needed to protect their group from threats, that violence between different groups is inevitable, and whether various actions ranging from civil disobedience through to armed conflict can be justified when 'defending the national way of life'.

These questions are specific to our sample. Clearly, in an ideal world we would compare and contrast the responses of supporters with those of the general public but for various reasons we can compare only between the BNP and UKIP, and then within the ranks of these supporters.

The results paint an interesting picture.

First, we can see clear and important differences between the BNP and UKIP supporters in our sample. Broadly speaking those who affiliate with the BNP are more likely to view preparing for conflict between groups as a justifiable action to defend the national way of life. Half of the BNP supporters in our sample expressing a view thought that preparing for conflict between different groups is always or sometimes *justifiable*, while this figure among UKIP supporters was 31%. Over a quarter of BNP supporters in our sample thought this action was *never justifiable*, this figure among UKIP supporters was 46%.

Aside from *preparing* for conflict, we also asked supporters whether actually engaging in armed conflict is a justifiable action when defending the national way of life. Again, it is those who affiliate with the BNP in our sample who are the most likely to view armed conflict as a justifiable course of action: just under two fifths of BNP supporters in our sample considered armed conflict to be always or sometimes justifiable, compared to a fifth of UKIP supporters in our sample. Among their group the 40% of BNP affiliates who said that armed conflict is never justifiable under any circumstances are in a minority.

As we will explore further, the responses also point towards a tranche of BNP supporters who endorse the view that both preparing for, and engaging in, inter-group conflict are *always* justifiable actions. One out of every five BNP supporter in our sample said that preparing for conflict is *always* justifiable, and one out of every ten considered armed conflict to be *always* justifiable. One question that remains unanswered, however, and which we address below, is whether these findings suggest there is an inner 'hardcore' of right-wing extremists who are more willing than other types of supporters to endorse violence and conflict.

5. Views towards Violence: A culture of conflict? continued

Table 1: **Perceived need to prepare for Group conflicts**

Which of the following do you regard as justifiable actions to defend the "national way of life" in this country? Responses to 'preparing yourself for conflict between groups and armed conflict'

	Preparing for Inter-Group Conflict		Armed Conflict	
	BNP	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**
Always justifiable	21.5	7.6	12.3	3.1
Sometimes justifiable	28.8	23.2	27.3	17.4
Rarely justifiable	23.4	23.2	20.6	19.6
Never justifiable	26.3	46.0	39.8	59.9
Total	**372**	**1,277**	**374**	**1,364**

To probe these views further, we also asked respondents about the extent to which they think violence may be needed to protect their group from threats. Similar to the findings above, it is the BNP supporters in our sample who are (by far) the most likely to express belief in the necessity of violence. Overall, of all respondents expressing a view, 64% of BNP supporters in our sample agreed that violence might be needed to defend their group from threats, compared to 34% of UKIP supporters in our sample. In contrast, 17% of BNP supporters in our sample disagreed that violence will be needed, compared to 38% of UKIP supporters.

Clearly, these results do not tell us the extent to which BNP supporters exhibit a greater propensity than supporters of other parties to endorse violence, or indeed members of the general public, but they do provide some evidence that the majority of BNP affiliates in our study appear to share a belief that violence may be needed in the future to defend their group from threats. Furthermore, supporters of the extreme right BNP express this view to a much greater extent than supporters of UKIP, who are distinctly less likely to endorse violence.

Table 2: **Perceived Necessity of Violence to Protect Group**

Statement: 'Violence may be needed to protect my group from threats'

	BNP	UKIP
Strongly agree	34.8	10.1
Tend to agree	29.3	24.1
Neither agree nor disagree	19.0	27.4
Tend to disagree	9.8	21.3
Strongly disagree	7.1	17.1
Total	**368**	**1,316**

A small selection of the weapons found at the home of BNP member Terence Robert Gavan, who was convicted of 22 offences relating to making and possessing explosive devices, firearms and ammunition

Similar findings emerge when we asked respondents about the perceived inevitability of violence between groups. In this question, violence is linked specifically to anticipated conflict between members of different ethnic, racial or religious groups, by asking supporters about the extent to which they agree or disagree that 'violence between different ethnic, racial or religious groups is largely inevitable.' In recent years, several individuals linked to the far right have been imprisoned after stockpiling explosives, an act that was traced by some to their belief in a forthcoming 'race war'.[39] We wanted to begin probing the extent to which others within the far right subculture share this belief.

Our findings suggest that, among our particular sample of BNP supporters, belief in the inevitability of inter-group violence is relatively widespread. Over 90% of our BNP affiliates agreed that inter-group violence is inevitable, compared to 75% of UKIP affiliates. Strength of agreement is also stronger for BNP supporters: while an overwhelming majority of BNP supporters endorsed this statement, almost three fifths of them *agreed strongly* that inter-group violence is inevitable (compared to 30% of UKIP affiliates). Though UKIP respondents felt less strongly than their right-wing extremist rivals about the necessity and inevitability of violence, our results suggest that large majorities of supporters in both groups are expecting relations between different ethnic, racial and religious groups to deteriorate into violence. In fact, only 2% of BNP affiliates and 13% of UKIP affiliates in our sample rejected the notion that intergroup violence is inevitable.

Likert attitude items as a scale. The table presents the mean position of these supporters recoded onto a -2 to +2 scale, where -2 is strongly disagree and +2 is strongly agree. Zero represents the neutral position on the question, the sign the direction of agreement or disagreement, and the size of the score the intensity of (dis)agreement.

When supporters of the BNP are asked about the extent to which they agree or disagree that 'violence may be needed to protect my group from threats', responses are clearly ordered according to their level of affiliation: members who are closest to the party have a mean position of 1.2, and are the most likely to endorse the need for violence. In a clear pattern, the intensity of this view lessens as we move away from the core of the BNP, and through our concentric circles of supporters: from member to former member, to identifiers, to voters and then to potential supporters.

Table 3: **Belief in the Inevitability of Violence**

Statement: 'Violence between different ethnic, racial or religious groups is largely inevitable'

	BNP	UKIP
Strongly agree	59.8	30.1
Tend to agree	31.9	45.1
Neither agree nor disagree	5.9	12.1
Tend to disagree	1.3	9.8
Strongly disagree	1.1	2.8
Total	**376**	**1,387**

Table 4

	Violence may be needed to protect my group from threats		Violence between different ethnic, racial or religious groups is largely inevitable	
	BNP	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**
Member	1.2	-0.1	1.8	0.9
Former member	1.1	-0.2	1.6	0.8
Identifier	0.7	0.0	1.5	1.0
Voter	0.7	-0.1	1.4	0.7
Future voter	0.4	-0.3	1.4	0.8
Total	**368**	**1,316**	**376**	**1,387**
EDL	-0.0 (198)		0.6 (207)	

-2 – +2 scale, -2 = strongly disagree, +2 = strongly agree

An Internal Culture of Conflict?

In terms of the questions above, however, it is vital to understand whether there are important and significant differences across *different types of supporters*. Are citizens at the core of the extreme right – the members and identifiers – more willing to endorse violence than citizens on the periphery of such groups?[40]

Table 4 presents responses of the disaggregated supporters when they are asked about the perceived necessity and inevitability of violence. As with the authoritarian and exclusionary attitudes, instead of presenting tables of percentages for each level of affiliation, we use a more comparable mean position for each group, interpreting the

Similarly, those who comprise the inner cadre of the BNP are also more likely to endorse the view that violence between different groups is largely inevitable, and are also significantly more likely than their UKIP counterparts to do so. In other words, while more casual supporters who have not enrolled in the party, and hence have not been socialised amidst the right-wing extremist subculture, appear more ambivalent towards the necessity of violence, those who are closer to the core and are more fully embedded within this subculture exhibit a stronger belief in the necessity of violence.

Supporters of UKIP, on the other hand, show much greater ambivalence towards the potential need for violence, tending towards disagreement (with the exception of identifiers). Similarly, on inter-group violence, whilst they tend to agree that violence between different groups is largely inevitable, the

5. Views towards Violence: A culture of conflict? continued

Table 5: **Attitudes to Immigration: Core and Periphery**

	Preparing for conflict between groups		Rioting		Armed conflict	
	BNP	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**	**BNP**	**UKIP**
Member	2.0	2.9	3.3	3.7	2.6	3.2
Former member	2.5	3.0	3.4	3.7	2.7	3.3
Identifier	2.6	3.1	3.4	3.7	2.8	3.3
Voter	2.7	3.2	3.3	3.8	2.9	3.4
Future voter	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.8	3.2	3.5
Total	**372**	**1,277**	**382**	**1,400**	**374**	**1,364**
EDL	2.9 (193)		3.1 (202)		3.3 (206)	

1 to 4 scale, 1 = always justifiable, 4 = never justifiable

positions of UKIP affiliates are much less intense than any of the BNP groups. Again, it is UKIP *identifiers* who emerge as more extreme on this scale, and significantly so, as compared with UKIP voters.

A similar effect emerges when we ask followers about the extent to which they agree or disagree that different types of action can be justified in order to defend the 'national way of life'. Overall, BNP supporters are not highly supportive of violent forms of protest, but there emerge clear differences between those on the edges of the party, and those at its core. Whereas the less strongly committed BNP voters appear generally ambivalent about preparing for future conflict between groups, among more committed members there is clear evidence that they are more likely to consider preparing for conflict as a justifiable course of action. Importantly, the gap here is noticeable: there is almost an entire point of a five-point scale that differentiates BNP members from their UKIP counterparts, whereas there is very little difference among UKIP supporters.

Support for armed conflict is lower. As above, the intensity of views towards the need for armed conflict among BNP affiliates exhibits a clearly ordered pattern, with these views becoming less intense as we move away from the party. In contrast, the spread for UKIP supporters is much smaller, and the positions are consistently less supportive than the BNP's. For BNP members, though, the mean position falls between sometimes and rarely, a position which we would not expect to see in a broader population, and indeed one which is not found in the other radical right (UKIP) group. Finally, in the context of the London riots of 2011, which occurred only a few months before the survey was carried out, it is little surprise to find that neither BNP nor UKIP supporters, and of any level of affiliation, consider rioting a justifiable action.

These results suggest those who are the closest to the core of the right-wing extremist BNP, the members, share a belief in a forthcoming scenario whereby violence will surely occur between their in-group, and members of threatening out-groups. The BNP members in our sample appear to view themselves as a core vanguard who are preparing for a forthcoming conflict in a way that the party's more passive supporters are not. These core supporters can be set against supporters of UKIP, who regardless of their affiliation express little belief in the perceived inevitability or necessity of violence. There is, then, a clear and specific effect at work in our study that is unique to the BNP, and is worthy of further examination.

6. Conclusions and Discussion

The starting point of this study was the observation that there is a clear need to explore more closely the backgrounds, attitudes and concerns of modern far right supporters, including their views towards violence. This task appears especially important given the current direction of the far right in Britain. As an electoral force, the British National Party (BNP) appears largely spent. The promising electoral returns that once met the party have now seemingly disappeared. When faced with dismal prospects, the tendency is for parties to turn in on themselves, and inhabit increasingly isolated, self-referential versions of political and social reality. Such a context may provide fertile ground for the growth of more extremist and combative forms of 'direct action', especially among an inner and more belligerent core of followers.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the threat from far right extremism. Despite repeated warnings, Western democracies have not experienced a sustained campaign of violence by right-wing extremist groups, or individuals linked to these networks. This was underscored by a Europol report in 2010, which mapped the challenges posed by different forms of violent extremism. The report noted how, in this year, there were a total of three Islamist terrorist attacks, 179 arrests of individuals for Islamist terrorist offences and 89 arrests of individuals for preparing attacks against EU member states. Meanwhile, there were a total of 160 attacks by violent separatist groups and 349 arrests of individuals for engaging in, or planning, such acts. In stark contrast, Europe witnessed not a single act of right-wing extremist terrorism. The comparatively weak challenge from the latter was attributed by the security services to a combination of poor internal cohesion, a low degree of coordination, lack of public support and effective law enforcement.[41]

To be clear, our study does not identify any certainty of violent activity by BNP supporters, even among core members. Clearly, the propensity and opportunity for violence are key ingredients to any actualisation of such behaviour. Moreover, individual personality traits that surveys tend to tap poorly play an overriding part in an individual's resorting to violent action. Equally, however, the finding that significant numbers of respondents are anticipating inter-group violence and/or endorsing pre-emptive action in order to defend a wider group from threats, is a worrying trait for a group of party supporters in a Western democracy to exhibit. The fact that actual violence has occurred in a number of high and low profile cases, both in Britain and other Western states, demonstrates the potential threat that such views represent.

Again, we cannot draw absolute conclusions as to the spread, wide or otherwise, of such attitudes in the wider population of BNP supporters, or the far right scene more widely. Rather, our exploratory study indicates simply the relative propensities across the two main parties to the Right of the Conservatives. Further research would be well placed by examining how widespread these attitudes are across the population at large. Inevitably, such stark evidence as our data provides suggests that the British population is unlikely to share positions with supporters of the BNP, or even UKIP, on these issues. Until we have formally tested this, however, that assumption remains speculation.

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Fear and HOPE
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APPENDIX 1
Description of Methodology

YouGov pre-screened its panel of over 350,000 UK adults to identify those respondents who met the requirements of the survey. These respondents were categorized as BNP/ UKIP members, voters, potential voters and identifiers, as well as a much smaller sample of EDL members. The survey was sent out, online, to 2,951 respondents across the above groups. The final achieved sample was 2,152 respondents representing a response rate of 73%.

Data is collected via YouGov's propriety scripting system Gryphon, and this is written directly back to a database written in C++ (MongoDB). Survey data can then be accessed via a number of tools including SPSS, Dimensions, and Excel by both researchers and the data processing team. Respondent data is stored against a unique identifier assigned to each panel member, which allows YouGov to match back to demographic information each time, without storing the data sets together in order to ensure data protection policies are observed as required.

The five different types of voters – the 'concentric circles' – were identified as mutually exclusive groups, e.g. a BNP member, who would in all likelihood be expected to have voted BNP in the previous general election, is only coded under member; voters are those supporters who are not members, and have never been members. Similarly, potential voters are those who indicated they would vote BNP at the next election, but had not done so at the previous general election.

Inevitably, there were a number of respondents who overlapped in their support of BNP and UKIP, for instance having been a member of one party but voting for the other. To ensure empirical clarity between the two sets of party supporters, we excluded the 99 individuals expressing a level of support for both parties. For information, Table XX opposite provides a count of the cross-affiliations for these 99 cases.

For the core of 386 BNP supporters and 1406 UKIP supporters, we then looked at their relative distributions on the variables of interest – socio-demographics and atitudes. The differences between the percentage distributions provides a relative indication of the two party positions, or more accurately of

their supporters, on each of these variables. However, given the nature of the sampling using the internet panel, these scores should only be read as indicative of the difference between parties; they should not be read as indicating absolute scores for the BNP or UKIP in the broader population.

		UKIP					
		Past Member	Member	Identifier	Voter	Future Voter	Total
B N P	Past Member	5	0	8	3	3	**19**
	Member	0	1	1	2	1	**5**
	Identifier	4	0	0	10	6	**20**
	Voter	3	3	23	0	13	**42**
	Future Voter	2	1	3	7	0	**13**
	Total	**14**	**5**	**35**	**22**	**23**	**99**

Furthermore, whilst these relative positions give a snapshot of the overall differences between BNP and UKIP supporters, the breakdown of the party supporters into five different types is, in our view, a more appropriate tool for looking at this heterogeneous group. Differences in relative positions of members, identifiers, voters and potential voters on the different attitudes implies that overall party scores may well be simplistic averages based upon skewed proportions of different types of voter. Without the capacity to weight for actual size of each of these groups (how many members? How many identifiers? How many voters?) the exact by-party distributions again needs to be treated carefully, although the cross-party comparison is still useful.

References and Notes

1   Clearly, we are not discounting a well-developed academic literature on the topic of far right support, but are rather suggesting that this has – on the whole – failed to permeate the wider policy literatures on extremism and its support. For a comprehensive review of the academic literature see Cas Mudde (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge University Press.

2   Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: BNP supporters do not merit sympathetic understanding, just outright condemnation, *The Independent,* Monday April 24th 2006

3   Home Affairs Committee (2012) *Nineteenth Report: Roots of Violent Radicalisation*, London: Home Affairs Select Committee

4   'Far right Freedom Party most popular among young Austrians'. Available online: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6250479,00.html (accessed Feb 3 2012).

5   'Far right unites in European initiative', *The Independent,* February 27 2012

6   Demos (Jamie Bartlett and Mark Littler)(2011) *Inside the EDL: Populist Politics in a Digital Age*, London: Demos

7   For details about individual cases see Home Affairs Committee, *Roots of Violent Radicalisation*

8   For a fuller discussion of this point see Matthew J. Goodwin (2012) *Right-Wing Extremist Violence: Causes and Consequences*, London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Available online: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ RadicalRight_Conference.pdf (accessed February 13 2012).

9   For example, most nationally representative surveys do not ask respondents about violence, such as the perceived inevitability of conflict between groups, or the need to resort to violence as a political strategy. However, when studying the far right past qualitative research has suggested that such questions may be more relevant, see M.J. Goodwin (2011) *New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party*, London: Routledge; also B. Klandermans and N. Mayer (eds.)(2006) *Extreme Right Activists in Europe: Through the Magnifying Glass*, London: Routledge.

10   For a more detailed and academic analysis of these two groups of supporters at the 2009 European elections, see Robert Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin and David Cutts (2012) 'Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol.51, issue 2, pp.204-234

11   The 'past member' category does not fit the concentric circle pattern as well as the other four groups, given that it indicates a level of historical support which may not continue today. However, as a group which was previously close to the militant centre, we place past members between current members and voters.

12   Party members have always been seen as the militant core to a party, often more radical in their views than politicians and other elites. Identification as a subsequent indicator of affiliation takes its lead from the classic Michigan studies beginning in the late 1940s (Campbell et al, 1960, *The American Voter*, New York: John Wiley). Finally, the difference between actual voter and potential voter draws on conceptual work by van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991)). "European parties' performance in electoral competition" in European Journal of Political Research 19(1): 17-34, and Bartolini (1999), 'Collusion, competition and democracy' (Part 1), Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(4); 435-470, which develops a notion of voter availability – parties one would potentially vote for but have not yet done so. The expectation is that parties to which one is 'available' will have at least some element in the programme which resonates with one's own political views. This approach also takes its lead from previous research on the European far right, particularly in France, which provides a more detailed picture of supporters by looking at their proximity to a party, and the characteristics that differentiate supporters with alternative levels of commitment See for instance Perrineau (1997) Le Symptôme Le Pen. Radiographie des électeurs du Front national, Paris: Fayard., Evans (2000) 'Le vote gaucho-lepéniste: le masque extrême d'une dynamique normale', Revue Française de Science Politique, 50:1, 21-51

13   For evidence and further discussion of these trends see David Voas and Rod Ling (2010) 'Religion in Britain and the United States', in A. Park, J. Curtice, K. Thomson, M. Phillips, E. Clery and S. Butt (eds.) *British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report*, London: Sage; Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson (2007) 'Resources, group conflict and symbols: Explaining anti-immigration hostility in Britain', *Political Studies*, 55, 709-732; Goodwin, *New British Fascism* (Chapter 3).

14   Robert Ford (2010) 'Who might vote for the BNP? Survey evidence on the electoral potential of the extreme right in Britain', in Roger Eatwell and Matthew J. Goodwin (eds.) *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain*, London: Routledge, p.161; see also Peter John and Helen Margetts (2009) 'The latent support for the extreme right in British politics', *West European Politics*, 32 (3), 496–513; and Nick Lowles and Anthony Painter (2010) *Fear and Hope: The new politics of identity*, Essex: Searchlight

15   UKIP (2010) *UKIP Manifesto: Empowering the People*, Devon: UK Independence Party

16   John and Margetts, 'The Latent Support for the Extreme Right in British Politics'.

17   Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012) find that UKIP voters can be divided into two groups: 'strategic' supporters who only vote UKIP at European Parliament elections and 'core' supporters who also vote UKIP at Westminster elections. Strategic supporters appear principally to be Conservative voters registering their hostility to the EU while core supporters are a poorer, more working class, and more deeply discontented group who closely resemble supporters of the BNP and European radical right parties. Robert Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin and David Cutts (2012) Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) at the 2009 European Parliament Elections', forthcoming in the *European Journal of Political Research*

18   EDL Mission Statement. Available online: http://englishdefenceleague.org/about-us/mission-statement/ (accessed February 9 2012)

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31   More recent work has separated out the different aspects of authoritarianism, and in some cases contrasted the elements of ethnocentrism which do not necessarily entail broader authoritarian attitudes.

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33   Pippa Norris (ed.) *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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35   Benjamin Bowyer (2010) Local context and extreme right support in England: The British National Party in the 2002 and 2003 local elections', *Electoral Studies*, vol.27, no.4, pp.611-620

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37   Whereby we interpret the Likert attitude items as a scale.

38   M.J. Goodwin (2011) *New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party*, London: Routledge

39   See, for example, Martin Wainwright, 'BNP men planned bombs for race war', *The Guardian*, Wednesday July 4 2007

40   It is worth noting that the next step in our study should be to compare these groups to a sample of the British population, to identify the 'violence gap' – which is clearly higher for the BNP than UKIP.

41   Europol (2011) *TE-Sat 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, European Police Office

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