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Bioterrorism
Nuala Moran
December 2001
Before the anthrax deaths, there was no US record of anyone being killed in a bioterrorist attack. Yet there was plenty of talk (much from official sources) about the ease with which terrorists might acquire biological agents – from rogue states, by theft or by brewing them up in a garage. So, what is the history of this biological weaponry and to what extent is bioterrorism a threat?
Biological arms race
Germany was the first country to develop and use biological weapons. In the First World War, undercover German agents attempted to manually disperse two agents, anthrax and glanders. They were trying to spread disease among packhorses and so disrupt enemy supply lines. In the years between the two world wars, France, USSR, Italy, Hungary, UK, Canada and Japan all established biological weapons programmes. In the 1930s, Japan used a range of agents in China, killing many thousands. Agent bombs were dropped on the Chinese to release typhoid, cholera and anthrax, and infected fleas were released to spread the plague.
But despite the increasing knowledge of how to turn bugs into bombs, biological weapons were not used in the Second World War. Interestingly, neither were chemical weapons, which were widely used in the First World War, even though most sides had them. There appear to be two main reasons for this. First, memories of the horrific effects of chemical weapons in the First World War deterred aggressors from unleashing further chemical or biological weapons. Second, there was unease over the indiscriminate nature of such weaponry – it might infect friend as well as foe.
During those inter-war years, a number of agents were considered for use, including anthrax, glanders, typhus, bubonic plague, cholera, foot and mouth, botulism, wheat rust and rinderpest. Initially, most programmes focused on spreading animal and crop pests, but expertise also grew in the 'weaponisation' of agents that could cause disease in humans.
As a result, the use of biological agents in warfare was increasingly seen as inevitable. They represented a potentially effective weapon: causing epidemics, thinning out troops, disorganising transport and demoralizing the people. In 1942, a report of the Special Committee for Biological Warfare, set up by the US National Academy of Sciences to analyse developments in biological weapons concluded the threat was real.
After the Second World War, it was recognised that biological weapons could be developed by small countries with limited resources. At that time, it would have been much cheaper to set up biological, as opposed to nuclear, warfare programmes. And tests could be carried out under the guise of legitimate medical or bacteriological research.
Treaty
The signing of the Biological Weapons Treaty of 1972 was expected to keep the genie in the bottle. And when it came into force in March 1975 it was praised for outlawing an entire class of weapons. In 1969, in advance of the treaty, the US unilaterally destroyed its biological weapons, though it did keep living examples of the agents. The reason was partly because it wanted to halt further development while the technology was still only in the hands of a few nations.
However, in the late 1980s it became clear that several countries, some of them signatories to the treaty, had set up biological weapons programmes. And in 1988, the US government estimated that 10 countries were developing biowarfare capability. Then in 1992, President Yeltsin of Russia admitted that the former USSR had violated the treaty, expanding its biological weapons research after 1972. This included research into genetic modification of biological agents to increase their virulence.
Terrorists groups
Since 1979, the US has annually released a list of countries which it claims sponsor terrorist groups: five of these, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Syria, have biological weapons programmes. So even if isolated terrorist groups could not launch a biological attack alone, there was concern they might get assistance from countries that back them.
In the 1990s, the nature of terrorism changed. Before, most terrorists groups wanted publicity and did not want to alienate potential supporters. But the 1990s saw the rise of terrorist groups that, rather than espousing political causes or aiming to take power, were concentrating on the infliction of damage. This is illustrated by the fact that although the number of terrorist attacks declined between 1991 and 1998, on average far more people were killed. In 1996, for example, there were 250 recorded terrorist attacks worldwide, the lowest since 1973, yet it was the fourth most deadly year since 1968.
The attacks of 11 September brought a further frightening factor into play. Terrorists with no concern for their own health and safety would presumably not be concerned about the personal risks involved in producing or disseminating biological weapons.
Terrorists acquiring bioweaponry
In order to acquire bioweaponry a terrorist would have to:
1. Obtain an appropriate strain of pathogen
2. Culture the pathogen
3. Weaponise the pathogen
Obtaining
Appropriate strains of disease pathogen may be obtained from countries with biological weapons programmes, procured from culture collections held by research and public health laboratories or collected from natural sources.
Even though terrorist groups have received state support to mount 'traditional' attacks, to date there is no evidence that any countries have provided them with biological weapons. Fears that biological arms may have been stolen from the former USSR are disqualified by President Vladimir Putin. He insists that biological weapons, in the Soviet Union and now in Russia, were and are well guarded. However, the former Soviet Union could be a source of expertise: as many as 70,000 scientists were involved in biological weapons programmes, but again, there is no evidence of any of them being subverted to work for terrorist groups.
There are a few documented cases of subversives posing as genuine scientists and procuring samples from culture collections. In the most famous case, in 1995, the American Type Culture Collection received an order for Yersinia pestis (the bacteria that causes bubonic plague) from Larry Wayne Harris. Harris, a white supremacist, used a fake company name and the identification number of a laboratory where he was previously employed to request three vials of the bacteria. They were dispatched, but staff became suspicious when Harris called in person to collect the order. The police were alerted and the vials were found, along with explosives and weapons in search of Harris' house. The motivations of this apparent lone operator are not clear, though he maintains his objective was to alert American citizens to the dangers of a biological attack from rogue states, such as Iraq.
The case prompted a reform of regulations in the US governing access to disease-causing pathogens. Similar access regulations also apply in some other countries. although not impossible, heightened awareness is making it more difficult for terrorists to get cultures from legitimate sources.
Bacteria are widespread, and there are plenty of textbooks describing how to collect them from natural sources and culture them. The difficulty is in isolating strains that are virulent. For example, the US bioweapons programme isolated more than 650 variants of Clostridium botulinum (the bacteria that causes botulism). From this, 12 were selected for further study, until finally just one strain was found that was suitable for producing toxin.
Culturing
What is not difficult or expensive, however, is getting hold of laboratory equipment. Indeed, a report by the US Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1995, The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat, says: 'Virtually any type of flask or useful container can be sterilized in an everyday pressure cooker and used to grow the organism.' Exemplifying this point, the Iraqis are said to have cultured biological agents in ordinary laboratory glassware.
Armed with the agent and the equipment, the next step is more difficult: culturing the agent. It requires knowledge of the medium on which the bacteria thrive and the appropriate environmental conditions in which they should be kept. According to Amy Smithson, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation Project at the Stimson Center in Washington DC, biowarfare agents are notoriously hard to culture: 'Slight mistakes with growth media, temperature or other control parameters can result in failure.'
Weaponising
Even if terrorists reached the stage of producing an agent they still face a challenge. The end product would be a wet slurry which, although biologically active, is not easy to disperse. The favoured terrorist device, a bomb, would be ineffective as the blast would kill most of the agent and not disperse the rest effectively.
Drying and concentrating the slurry is technically difficult and hazardous. It requires specialized equipment to spray or freeze-dry the bugs, which must then be treated to make the spores fine enough to become airborne. The equipment and expertise to carry out these procedures is becoming more widely available, but it is still a difficult process.
One fear is that terrorists could disperse biological agents in the water supply. Adding agents to a reservoir would not work because the chemicals used to purify water at treatment plants, eg chlorine, would kill them. So the agent would have to be introduced in between the treatment plant and tap stages – generally an enclosed system. And because the agent would be so diluted, massive quantities would need to be added in order to have any effect. Furthermore, swallowing is not the most harmful route of exposure for most agents.
Dry and liquid agents could be delivered by aerosol, but the mechanical damage caused by forcing the agent through a nozzle would kill most of the pathogens. Also, once released, biological agents would be extremely sensitive to, and could be killed by, sunlight, humidity and temperature.
Bioterrorist attacks
Many commentators say the growth of biotechnology and the increasing number of microbiologists and biomanufacturing specialists means the skills and equipment for producing biobombs are widespread. But the fact remains that the only documented case of terrorists attempting to manufacture and release lethal biological weapons ended in failure.
It was in March 1995 that the religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo, released the (chemical) nerve gas sarin into the Tokyo subway, killing 13 and injuring several hundred. After their arrest, the investigation revealed that between 1990 and 1994 the cult had attempted to produce biological agents. They had even tried to release them in and around Tokyo on nine occasions, but to no avail. The cult had tried and failed to weaponise two agents, botulism and anthrax, both of which are said to be easy to source and manipulate. But despite devoting much time, money (around US$20 million), expertise and effort the cult's bioprogram proved ineffective.
The Tokyo subway event led to US Senate hearings in October 1995 and brought bioterrorism into the public consciousness. But rather than alarming the public by the supposed ease of launching an attack, all the evidence indicated that it was in fact very difficult. The cult's plans failed even though they had money for equipment, the facilities, several people with PhDs in relevant disciplines and were able to work undisturbed for four years. And despite worries of lax security surrounding the biological weapons programme of the former USSR, two front companies set up by the cult to purchase equipment failed to obtain assistance or technology from this source.
There is however one recorded bioterrorism attack, which although not lethal, did succeed in spreading disease. In a town called The Dalles, Oregon, in 1984, the Rajneeshee Cult laced salad bars in local restaurants with salmonella: 751 people became ill, though no one died. The group had discussed using a more serious agent, but decided against it because their aim was to incapacitate large numbers of the local population, in order to prevent them from voting in a local election. although this deliberate act is alarming, it should be noted that there are 76 million cases of salmonella poisoning each year in the US.
In Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and analysis (2001), the analyst Dr Milton Leitenberg of the Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland says: 'Contrary to a massive amount of disinformation purveyed in recent years, it is not a simple matter either to obtain, or to prepare human pathogens for use as biological agents.'
It remains to be seen to what extent the anthrax attacks in the US undermine this view. The evidence so far indicates that the original source of the material was from the US biological programme. Reports say the anthrax was genetically similar to the strains used, and that the same technique was employed to dry the spores to make them airborne. As to the perpetrator(s), the intelligence agencies are leaning towards a lone, domestic extremist.
No doubt, it remains difficult to mount a bioterrorist attack that kills many people. But the anthrax experience of the US shows that the reaction to an attack alone, coupled with the inevitable hoaxes that follow, can be enough to have a crippling social and economic impact upon a country.
Find out more
Channel 4 is not responsible for the content of third party sites
Websites
Janes
www.janes.com
The ultimate source for defence, aerospace and transportation information. Type 'bioterrorism' in the search engine and find some excellent articles on anthrax and agricultural terrorism.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office London
www.fco.gov.uk
Contains up-to-date speeches from the PM and ministers, plus a good search facility with articles on issues of biological warfare, including current scares about anthrax.
US Department of State – International Information Programs
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/
pol/arms/bcw/bcwarch.htm
US biological and chemical weapons archives, with articles and press releases.
Chemical/Biological/Radiological Incident Handbook
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
cbr_handbook/cbrbook.htm#0
Online CIA publication, originally published in 1995, that explains the different types of incident plus personal safety considerations.
Scientific American – The Specter of Biological Weapons
www.sciam.com/1296issue/1296cole.html
Article covering many issues, although the links within this are often dead.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project
www.stimson.org/cwc/
Offers information on the panoply of issues associated with chemical and biological weapons.
Channel 4 Health House
www.channel4.com/health/microsites/H
/health/magazine/illness/health_biol.html
Medical look at the risks of bioterrorism. Discusses botulism, the plague, smallpox and anthrax.
Books
Factories of Death: Japanese biological warfare 1932-45 and the American cover-up by Sheldon H. Harris (Routledge, 2001) £16.99
Details the activities of Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army, a formation dedicated to conducting bacterial warfare research in Manchuria. Under the command of Colonel Ishii Shiro, the unit conducted many experiments in the 1930s and 1940s which involved the use of living subjects. The author shows how the US government provided immunity from investigation for men who thereby avoided war crimes trials, so that the US could acquire the results of Japanese expertise in bacteriological warfare.
Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, apocalyptic violence, and the new global terrorism by Robert Jay Lifton (Owl Books, 2000) £10.99
After studying the history of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo (instigators of the 1995 nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway), the author believes them to be 'only one group in a loosely connected, still-developing global subculture of apocalyptic violence, who we ignore at our future peril'. Disturbingly prophetic.
Anthrax by Jeanne Guillemin (University of California Press, 2001) £12.95
Exhaustive, authoritative and scientifically responsible account of the largest epidemic of inhalation anthrax yet on record. In 1992 the author travelled to the city of Sverdlovsk in Russia's Ural Mountains which, in 1979 was struck by a frightening anthrax epidemic with reports of 64 human deaths.
Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert advice and science policy 1930-1965 by Brain Balmer (Palgrave, 2001) £45
The story of Britain's little known but significant involvement in biological weapons.
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