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The Union Carbide plant at Bhopal was built in the 1970s. In its early years, it was, according to Kamal Pareek, a former chemical engineer and maintenance engineer at the plant, 'one of the most efficient and safe chemical complexes in India'. But standards at the plant in terms of both the equipment and the working practices were not

maintained. When Mr Pareek resigned from Union Carbide in 1983, he mentioned in his leaving interview that he believed trouble was in store. No effective action was taken on his warning.

For more than a year before the accident, critical instruments designed to show pressure readings and temperature levels were malfunctioning. One of the faulty gauges was supposed to give readings for the pressure of the deadly chemical methyl isocyanate (MIC), which was kept in an underground storage tank.

Not only had the quality of the equipment at Union Carbide deteriorated, but correct procedures were not being followed by staff and management. Just one month before the accident, one of the operators at the plant reported that he had been unable to raise the pressure within the MIC tank and so suspected a leak. No action was taken.

On the day of the accident, a worker cleaning the plant's maze of pipework failed to follow safety instructions. He omitted to insert a 'slip blind' a piece of metal that isolates sections of pipe as they are being cleaned. When the pipes that were being washed became choked with dirt, water began to back up. Because no slip blind had been inserted, the water began flowing into one of the main pipe systems running throughout the plant. It was not contained in one area.