A Parliamentary Killing

The law

Individual freedoms were vulnerable in the 17th century. It was not until the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 that statute allowed prisoners to demand that they should be brought before a court to have their cases heard.

The legal definition of murder stretches back to the early part of the 17th century. The hugely influential English jurist Edward Coke laid down a description of murder for law that still stands today:

'Murder is when a man [interpreted to mean woman as well] of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth within any country of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura [natural] under the king’s peace, with malice aforethought, either expressed by the party or implied by law, so as the party wounded, or hurt die of the wound or hurt within a year and a day after the same.'

Without the year and a day rule, a person who wounded someone would remain under threat of prosecution for their murder forever. Since we are all going to die, murder is in fact simply an acceleration of death. What matters is whether the wound inflicted by an attacker caused the death and the jurists felt that it would not be possible to show such link after more than a year and a day had elapsed.

In addition, the attacker would have to be shown to have intended to kill or been so reckless as to the consequences of his or her acts that the law would imply such an intention. Malice aforethought does not mean that the attacker needed to have planned the assault for any length of time, but rather that, according to a rule laid down in 1975:

1. The suspect intended to kill, or
2. The suspect intended to do an act knowing that it was probable that it would kill any person, or
3. The suspect intended to cause grievous bodily harm [serious injury] to any person, or
4. The suspect intended to do an act knowing that it was probable that it would cause grievous bodily harm to any person.

Up until the 1960s the death penalty was the sentence for murder, but in the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965, this ultimate punishment was suspended and has never been re-introduced.

Similar considerations to the 1975 rules of intention applied in the Victorian era, but little regard was given to extenuating circumstances that may have led the suspect to kill. This qualification arrived after Ruth Ellis was hanged in 1955 for shooting dead her lover who was trying to end their tempestuous affair. Such was the public outcry that followed her execution, that the Homicide Act 1957 was introduced. It allowed a person to escape the death penalty through a lesser conviction for manslaughter if it could be shown to the jury’s satisfaction that the attacker were provoked in a way that 'was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did'.

Manslaughter, rather than murder, may apply if the suspect can not be shown to have had malice aforethought. This would include assailants intending to inflict some, but not serious, harm or gross negligence in performing a duty, such as an operation.

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