

"THE IRAQ COMMISSION"

INTERVIEW WITH DR TOBY DODGE 7 June 2007

Time-codes	Dialogue
09:02:46:04	<p>Paddy Ashdown</p> <p>Dr Dodge, thank you very much for coming to see us today. I think you know the purpose of The Commission so I don't need to spend time on that, we've got about half an hour. The panel, I think, will be well known to you already. David Hannay of course on my furthest right, Asim Siddiqui, Paul Lever, Maeve Sherlock, I'm sure you know them or know of them already. I think you know</p>
09:03:02:19	<p>the form, we'd be very grateful for a few words from yourself and then have to submit you to a few questions from the panel if we may.</p>
09:03:11:22	<p>Dr Toby Dodge</p> <p>Certainly, I was vehemently against the invasion and spent a lot of 2002, after coming back from Baghdad, and 2003 trying to convince both the British government and the American government that this was a very bad idea and the reason I was against the invasion was that wishful thinking, ideology and best case scenarios were taking the place of planning. Now keep that in mind</p>
09:03:36:20	<p>because against that background I'm also vehemently against what is quickly becoming the conventional wisdom, which is to pull troops out, run away and hope for the best. Again, assumptions, wishful thinking, ideology and, I think, the brutal promotion of State interest, the State interest of Britain and America, are once again being promoted over what would be best for the Iraqi people.</p>
09:04:02:14	<p>Now the reason I state that in such stark terms is that Iraq is in the midst of a</p>

civil war, undoubtedly the case now. Keep in mind that this is not a simple fact. It isn't a civil war driven forward by supposedly trans-historical communal antipathy. The cause of this civil war is quite simply the collapse of the Iraqi State. Iraq had been placed under 13 years of the most coercive and

09:04:27:06 indeed effective sanctions ever placed on a country in diplomatic history. They were designed specifically to collapse the State and miraculously they worked but at the wrong time. The State collapsed in April 2003 as the American troops reached Baghdad. The American military forces didn't have enough power on the ground to control the looting and the looters took to

09:04:50:12 pieces what was left of the Iraqi State, stripped the buildings, then the American policy of deBaathification, the disbanding of the army took care of what was left. So the civil war is a myriad of armed forces, armed groups from criminals right through to the militias of the 2 Kurdish parties, stepping into that security vacuum and using violence to pursue their own best aims. Now, against that

09:05:18:00 background, pulling out, drawing troops down would do 2 things, both in Basra and in Baghdad. It would take, albeit haphazard but still a break off the violence, it would be a free for all, it would drive violence forward. Now there is argument, a particularly gruesome one that says, that's ok, let them fight it out until a winner comes about; that won't happen. The final legacy that

09:05:46:17 Saddam Hussein has left this country is to a great deal of violence, a great deal of money combed through that society from 1968 to 2003 breaking any organised resistance. So all those groups fighting each other have only come into existence after 2003. So there's a low level of organisational military capacity, which means they'll fight on and on. An American withdrawal will

09:06:14:23 lead, I suspect, to the evolution of warlordism. The consolidation of pockets of domination as we see up in the Kurdish North, the KDP and the PUK dominating areas of territory surrounded by a sea of violence. Also, and finally, an American withdrawal will stop any possible solution. Once 160,000

09:06:40:18 American troops have gone home I can't see the United Nations, or indeed
the international community at large, intervening once again. So the US
occupation is troublesome, it's problematic and it's not solving the solution.
However, if you withdraw, any potential solution will be taken off the table and
the situation will get much, much worse, much more quickly. Those in favour
of withdrawal will have to justify their assumption, their naïve assumption that
09:07:06:16 somehow violence is going to decrease and they're going to have to argue
very forcibly what replaces the US when they go. Those are the 2 questions
that need to be answered.

09:07:17:16 **Paddy Ashdown**

Dr Dodge, withdrawal is impossible, or very unwise. Staying on in our present
posture is, well how shall we put it, euphemistically almost impossible, very
difficult, so, what's the third option?

09:07:30:02 **Dr Toby Dodge**

There may well not be a third option, I don't come here with any magical
cures sadly. I'm an optimist by analytical training and by disposition but Iraq
from 2003 onwards has robbed me of the capacity for optimism. I think the
best we can hope for is a slow move towards multilateralising the occupation,
both politically and militarily. US public opinion is muscularly running against
09:07:58:22 keeping troops in the country. The only way we can stop that is by bringing
the United Nations, bringing the European community, bringing world, the
international community in as a whole, but secondly, as I've said in my written
submission, the Iraqi government, as constituted at the moment, is also part
of the problem. It's incoherent. I spent April in Baghdad, travelling through
09:08:23:08 the Iraqi government, travelling further south, going into Basra and what I
found was the non existence of a State. You have a series of party fiefdoms
where the ministers used to be asset stripping, either for their own party
constituencies or for personal greed and indulging in sectarian politics. So

09:08:49:21 the Iraqi State needs to be reconstituted for there to be stability. The current Iraqi government cannot do it. The current US occupation is finding great difficulty doing it. Both have to be reconstituted.

09:08:57:22 **Paddy Ashdown**

I think history may say, looking back on 35 years of conflict in Northern Ireland, that although we thought we were making peace for all of those 35 years, and I was a soldier in the first of them, in fact all we were doing was containing the situation until the ingredients for peace emerged because we couldn't afford to do any other. Is that what you're saying the future of Iraq could be?

09:09:16:23 **Dr Toby Dodge**

That may well be the rather grubby and uninspiring bottom line that what we would be doing is holding the ring while and stopping the descent into complete civil war because what stands between the Iraqi political parties as constituted, and a complete all out civil war, is the occupation. Remove the occupation and remove very quickly to civil war, as I've said before, I think

09:09:42:20 which no one will win. So what we're doing is holding the ring and if and until a situation where the political parties as constituted, or new political parties can come together in some form of national compact but that ring needs to be hold, needs to be held. I think civil wars when we see them, State collapse and civil wars are rarely, if ever, indigenously solved. If they are, it's by the

09:10:07:03 triumph of one party over another. You need to solve a civil war and to rebuild the State a muscular, multilateral intervention to create the environment within which agreement is reached and States are rebuilt.

09:10:22:08 **Paddy Ashdown**

I mean that presumes that there will be a political will in the United States to sustain something like a 35 year containment. David Hannay.

09:10:30:20 **David Hannay**

I'd just like to go a little bit further into this question of timelines, deadlines and so on. I take it, from what you've said, that you are very strongly opposed to any setting of an absolutely formal early date by which all foreign troops will be withdrawn from Iraq, that's one end of the debate that's going on in the United States now, the end end which is championed largely by the

09:10:55:20 Democrats in congress? The other end, book end as it were, is staying 'as long as it takes', a completely open ended commitment. Do you think that that is either desirable or politically sustainable in the United States and Britain, and if you don't think that is so, do you think there is some middle ground in which time factors can be introduced but in a way that is not totally

09:11:24:14 damaging of the stability of Iraq, which is already highly unstable?

09:11:31:01 **Dr Toby Dodge**

I think that probably if I can unpack that 3 separate questions there. The first is the logic behind the congressional democrats in Washington's demand for a timeline. Now they're very overt about this. They argue that by declaring an overt timeline for troop withdrawal, you'll impose a rationality on Iraqi politicians. Now I don't necessarily disagree with that assumption but what

09:11:56:18 they're doing is trying to second guess what that rationality'll lead to. My own interpretation differs from the Congressional democrats, that if you declare a timeline what you're doing is firing the starting gun on the civil war. That the rationality won't be, ok chaps, let's negotiate a power sharing, it'll be, alright, let's retreat to our fortresses, our militias, and fight it out in a zero some

09:12:23:12 struggle for denomination. And I would say that large numbers of the Iraqi political elite are already involved in ethnic cleansing, death squad tactics, the initial stages of a civil war. Why would declaring a timeline stop that? I think it's much more likely that it would exacerbate it. Moving on to American public opinion. I think, clearly, American public opinion, for very

understandable

09:12:47:02 reasons, is draining away. The next presidential election will be fought over 2 large issues. One, who got us into this mess? And both the Republicans and Democrats will be distancing themselves desperately from the decision to invade and, more importantly, who can get us out? You know, the short, the historical shorthand would be bring us the Henry Kissinger and a Richard

09:13:08:07 Nixon and that point I think leads us to the unpalatable decisions that would have to be taken to pull the US out. Whoever is elected to the White House will be elected on a very heavily Iraq-sceptic ticket. Barack Obama saying, let's go, Hilary Clinton trying to mediate the starkness of that decision. But whoever wins comes into the White House, assumes the responsibility of

09:13:32:01 State against a background of a powerful head of steam amongst American public opinion to pull troops out. I think it's going to be very, very difficult for that United States President to take that decision because pulling American troops out of a collapsed State in the midst of a civil war, at the centre of the most geo-economic important region in the world, is going to be a difficult

09:13:55:21 decision. So the next American President is gonna be wrestling public opinion with interests of State, which means they probably will pull out, but to the tail end of the next Presidency. There won't be a speedy pull out and that may well result in that President becoming a one term President. So, that's the first question, that's the second question. The third question is, so what

09:14:13:14 would you do differently? I think if one recognises that the current occupation, as it is organised, it's unsustainable, pulling out is unsustainable, then the next President, because it's not George Bush, will be greeted with a huge international sigh of relief and some leeway. You take that leeway, you go back to the United Nations and you say, the last time I looked Iraq isn't on the

09:14:39:16 edge of the United States, it's on the edge of Europe. That makes Iraq and that collapsed State, although caused by United States intervention, primarily a European and indeed an international problem, it needs a European and an international solution. Let's multilateralise, let's move towards a much greater

09:15:01:18 commitment of the great powers. Of the neighbours, a regional conference, a compact to bring the neighbours in and of the international community as a whole.

09:15:05:21 **David Hannay**

Well I would agree with you about the neighbours but I do find your thesis on the United Nations one which rouses a good deal of scepticism. I find it really difficult, and perhaps you'd comment on this, to see the United Nations Security Council mandating a major peacekeeping force to go into Iraq in the circumstances you describe. What would its mandate be? To defend the Shiite government against the Sunni insurgency, but no United Nations force has ever been given a mandate of that sort and even if you gave it, the chances of anybody volunteering any troops to do it must be as close to zero as you can get.

09:15:42:21 **Dr Toby Dodge**

I don't disagree with anything you've said. This is recommending multilateralism with a sadly pessimistic realism. So I think you'd have to do 2 things. Firstly, you'd have to put the neighbours within an overall, a multilateral framework that would confidence build and, at the very minimum, reduce the ongoing temptation to use Iraq as a cockpit for fighting out regional rivalries. So that's the first thing. Secondly, a UN mandate would range from, at a minimum, a much larger role in trying to facilitate negotiations. The US clearly isn't an unbiased partner and my understanding is it hasn't got the attention and the commitment to really intervene as it needs to.

09:16:27:09 **Man**

You mean a new Brahimi?

09:16:28:20 **Dr Toby Dodge**

09:16:54:20 A new Brahimi with a multilateral mandate, who isn't simply the bag carrier of the United States that lost its commitment to Brahimi and, quite frankly, humiliated him. Lakhdar Brahimi came to Iraq thinking that he had a US Presidential mandate to impose a situation on Iraqi politicians. When he came up with I think a very plausible solution at that time it was, quite rightly and quite understandably, unpalatable to the US, to Iraqi politicians. Iraqi politicians went back to Washington and Washington unceremoniously dumped Lakhdar Brahimi. So, if a new Brahimi went back he'd have to have a multilateral, a UN mandate and the power to intervene over and above, to shape the territory, to shape the arena, over and above an American veto.

09:17:18:01 **Paddy Ashdown**
Thank you. Paul?

09:17:21:13 **Paul Lever**
Could I try to move you away from the Americans and Iraq as a whole down to Basra and the British? You argued that the onus is on those who advocate withdrawal to explain why this would improve things. But surely, if you were the parents of a young British soldier about to be posted out to Basra, you'd put it the other way round wouldn't you, you'd say the onus is on the British government to explain to me what good my son or my daughter is going to do out there, and I don't sense from your presentation so far any particular military mission for our forces in and around Basra or really any particular political role for Britain to play there. So the onus is surely to explain, why should we stay rather than why should we leave?

09:18:18:13 **Dr Toby Dodge**
Although structured in emotive terms, I think it's a fairly, it's a justifiable question and I'll answer it in 2 ways. Withdrawing British troops from Basra, albeit their small and largely ineffective force, will lead directly to increased

09:18:46:22 violence. They act at the moment as a very partial but still a break on violence and that will then set a chain reaction of violence, increasing violence across the south of the country. So at the moment British forces in their greatly reduced and largely ineffectual numbers are acting as a break. Pull them out, many more people'll die and it will contribute to the spreading of regional instability and undoubtedly if it isn't the British, then a multilateral force will have to go in at a minimum to stop the spread of that contagion

09:19:08:00 across its borders. So, at a moment the British forces are acting as, are in a holding pattern, that's the first issue. Now, we can argue about the reasons for the invasion but my best interpretation of why Tony Blair took the rather, the decision to support the US invasion is because of the special relationship and because he wanted to cement the relationship between the White House and 10 Downing Street. There is a great deal of resentment amongst the US military and the US political elite at the first decision to reduce British troop numbers in Basra. It was extremely badly handled and has created a deal of anger. If you then move on to that second position, completely withdrawing British troops, you are going to damage the transatlantic relationship. Now

09:19:58:03 that, with that in mind, if you want to do that, if you want to increase violence in Basra and damage the transatlantic relationship well then that's fine, but be overt about why those British troops are there for 2 reasons and then say, fine, those 2 reasons aren't worth the death of further British troops. I think that's a plausible and indeed defensible position but let's be overt about what

09:20:20:13 pulling British troops out would cause before we call for that withdrawal.

09:20:26:07 **Paddy Ashdown**
Asim.

09:20:27:10 **Asim Siddiqui**
I mean Dr [INAUDIBLE] can talk about the need for keeping foreign troops within Iraq to help with stability. I mean many people say the source of the

instability is the presence of foreign troops. You talk about the need to move towards a more multilateral approach, presumably because of the unpopularity of American and British soldiers there. I mean which countries do you think should start contributing those troops?

09:20:45:02

09:20:48:10 **Dr Toby Dodge**

Well again, there's 2 questions. The source of the violence. Certainly, there were 2 sources of the violence up until February 22nd 2006, to take a general date. The first was the collapse of the Iraqi State and up to 80 percent of violence through to 2006 was criminal in nature, that's indicative not at that point of civil war and even not, indeed, of a war of so called liberation or insurgency it's indicative of a vacuum in law and order. No one could impose law and order. In February 2006, as we know the Alaskari Mosque was demolished, one of the most holy shrines in Shiite Islam, that triggered vicious sectarian ethnic cleansing in Baghdad, largely perpetrated by the [JAYSHALMAFTI] the army of, the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr and removed unambiguously into a civil war. So we have maybe 3 different sources of violence now. Criminality, the collapsed State leading to this security vacuum, the insurgency and the civil war. You pull foreign troops out, the insurgency which has increasingly justified itself now in sectarian rhetoric will continue and it'll just turn fully towards killing Shiites. So pulling foreign troops out will increase the violence. The 2nd, where will other foreign troops come from under a multilateralisation? This isn't easy, and again, this is low expectations and eyes wide open pessimism but if we are to change this situation, if we are to rescue Iraq from this kind of Hobbesian nightmare of a war of all against all, foreign troops aren't to be withdrawn, the nature of the occupation has to be transformed.

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09:22:41:22 **Paddy Ashdown**

Dr Dodge, can I ask you just to concentrate on that question. The

consequences of withdrawal is either, and please say which you think it will be, a descent into warlordism, what you all the war of all against all or the beginnings of a civil war, potentially at a regional scale between Sunni and Shiite, which of those 2 is most likely?

09:23:01:20 **Dr Toby Dodge**

I think it's a timeline. You pull foreign troops out, you catapult Iraq into the midst of a civil war, I think undoubtedly.

09:23:09:21 **Paddy Ashdown**

This is warlord driven civil war or is it a religion driven civil war?

09:23:13:17 **Dr Toby Dodge**

Let me get the timeline right. The civil war starts, the civil war is on a very kind of low platform because the groups fighting it are disorganised, have only been created since 2003. As the civil war evolves, over possibly as long as a decade, then those groups will solidify. I don't think one will triumph but their geographic areas of operation will solidify as different militias or fractions of militias get the capacity to control certain areas. So what we're talking is not the neat division of Iraq but the fragmentation into warlord dominated areas, broadly comparable to Afghanistan before the rise of the Taliban.

09:23:40:12

09:23:55:17 **Paddy Ashdown**

So it's not going to be Sunni – Shiite in that sense?

09:23:58:00 **Dr Toby Dodge**

No, I think that ... The idea that you can divide Iraq into 3 neat sections shows both historical, geographical and indeed comparative illiteracy. That basically, I think it's 75 percent of Iraq's population are in 3 major multi faith cities that, if and when Iraq is divided, it'll be divided in a fracture way.

09:24:29:01 Secondly, the so called 3 communities are deeply divided internally. You have a low level violent conflict between the 2 main Shiite representatives, erm Muqta dal Sada's party or organisation and a supreme Islamic Council, it used to be called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, you go up north, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the [INAUDIBLE] Kurdistan, fought a vicious civil war between themselves in the mid 90's for dominion

09:24:50:14 that crescendoed in the Kurdish Democratic Party, bringing in Saddam Hussein to try and back them so all 3 communities are deeply divided, internally fighting each other and spread throughout Iraq. So it's not, the division, if and when it comes, will be fractured and very violent.

09:25:09:17 **Paddy Ashdown**
Thank you, Paul?

09:25:11:22 **Paul Lever**
I'd like to still come back to this question of the role which you think British forces can continue usefully to play in and around Basra. I mean we've withdrawn from several provinces, we're drawing down 5,000, we're moving, it seems, into a situation where our forces will essentially be based at the airport with the occasional odd foray out of their [lager]. Can you really
09:25:41:04 sustain the argument that the presence of such a modest amount of military force, limited in the future essentially to one cut off area, is going to hold the lid on a situation which otherwise will be explosive? I mean what is the evidence that if this small contingent of forces were no longer there, warlordism would immediately erupt, but it won't so long as they're there
09:26:09:08 sitting in the airport?

09:26:10:03 **Dr Toby Dodge**
Now let me be clear about the modesty of my claims of the British troop

presence. The British troop presence has been tiny right from the beginning. The British forces in Basra and the south have never involved in State building, never involved themselves in the imposition of law and order. They recognised very early on that they didn't have the forces to do that. The

09:26:29:00 reason I think within the military and with General Danat's extraordinary, and I think factually incorrect outburst about drawing British troops down was my understanding, is that they were promised by a now departed Secretary of Defence that they wouldn't be forced to do Afghanistan and Iraq at the same time because they simply haven't got the capacity. So the pressure for

09:26:50:21 drawing down British troops is about the size of the British army, I think, internal to the military. The pressure for drawing down British troops under a Brown premiership may well be about drawing a line under the mistakes of his predecessor. What I'm saying, the British troops in Basra have a dual role. The first is not to keep a lid on the situation, the situation was never controlled

09:27:14:10 by British troops, but to limit the extent to which the situation gets out of control. I think that's a fairly profound distinction between those 2, the way you represented the position, the way I'm representing the position and the second, and I think probably the main reason for US, for British backing the American invasion is to keep relations with the

09:27:35:13 Americans healthy. Now, I take your position [TALKING OVER EACH OTHER]

09:27:43:20 **Paul Lever**
Haven't they done enough to to sustain our relationship with the United States already in Iraq?

09:27:46:00 **Dr Toby Dodge**
No, the resentment both within Washington and within Bag..., within US forces in Baghdad and within political circles in Washington, the resentment directed at Britain's initial decision to draw down troops is very, very high and

09:28:11:16 will get much worse if the situation continues. Now, your position may well be, neither of those are worth another British life, fine, but be overt about what you are saying. Drawing British troops out of Basra, even out of the airport, will increase violence and will make a re-intervention to limit violence much more difficult and will undoubtedly damage transatlantic relations.

09:28:27:13 **Paddy Ashdown**

Dr Dodge you've been tremendously helpful to us, thank you very much but I just go, running short of time inevitably in these things, this is extremely weighty stuff. 4 quick questions. 2 from me, 1 from David Hannay and one from Maeve for quite quick answers. You've been very eloquent recently, I've read your stuff on the Petraeus Plan of which the surge is only one part, 09:28:45:14 there's the other element of the Petraeus Plan that we've not yet seen. The question simply is, can this succeed? Second question, which perhaps you'd just very briefly touch on, which may be helpful to us, is, after Iraq shall we ever intervene again? David.

09:28:59:17 **David Hannay**

Well, adding on the surge question, what comes after the surge? Obviously, you're answer to that is important but there's a September deadline for reviewing where the surge has got to. What are the present President's options given, I agree with you, that's he gonna do a fundamental change of course?

09:29:19:16 **Paddy Ashdown**

And Maeve?

09:29:20:10 **Maeve Sherlock**

Mine was a very quick one which was whether the consequences of our withdrawal from those provinces from which British troops have withdrawn

gives you evidence to support your suggestions to what would happen if we pulled out completely?

09:29:31:07 **Dr Toby Dodge**

Ok, can the surge work? Now speaking in a personal capacity and having witnessed what the surge is trying to do, I think it is heading in the rig... I mean, I think the policy is correct, that basically you ... the military aspect of the surge was designed to freeze the civil war, to stop ethnic cleansing and to stop that circle of atrocity and counter atrocity primarily in Baghdad and

09:29:56:08 specifically on the west bank of the Tigris where the Sunni population is concentrated. So, ironically the surge was designed at saving the Sunni population of Baghdad from ethnic cleansing. It was designed to do that for a specific political end, to create the space within which a political settlement could be negotiated. Is it working? Well, for the first couple of months it

09:30:20:13 probably was. Now, it's difficult to say because that vicious circle of atrocity – counter atrocity is gearing back up. Those orchestrating the surge would argue that the peak number of troops, roughly around 160,000, doesn't come until June so it's too early to say. The second part of the surge, which is much more political, is to directly target the Iraqi government and say, there

09:30:47:00 are things, aspects of you are involved in, ethnic cleansing, the denial of services on the basis of sectarian agendas, that must stop and you must stop now. Again, to try and pull the Sunni community into dialogue. Are they gonna do that? I don't know. I suspect recent reports within the press suggest that they may not have the capacity or the willpower to push that

09:31:12:20 through, we'll have to see. What happens after the surge? Well the surge, I suspect, will run through to early years of next year, to the Spring of next year. If it fails, you're quite right, I think Bush will continue on and may well have more political autonomy in an America dominated by a presid... Presidential campaign to do that. The worry is that once the surge hasn't

09:31:35:19 worked, if the surge doesn't work, that he may try and move forward to a knee

09:31:59:16 jerk attempt to sort out all the problems, i.e., I have no insights into this but this is speculation, that he may move to underst... to undermine Prime Minister Maliki and replace him with a more forceful, a more centralising figure, either possibly Iyad Allawi or [ARALAK]Abdul-Mahdi of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Those are 2 options. I think that would be a mistake and would probably worsen the situation, reduce the even more incoherent nature of the Iraqi State. So that's the first thing. The second thing, on Basra, leaving the bigger question to last. I think the withdrawal of British forces from governets in the south has sparked 2 things. On occasion

09:32:25:22 it's sparked out and out conflict between the 2 main parties, Muqtada al Sadr's party and the Supreme Council, both of which have heavily colonised, if not corrupted the police and armed forces, and they... they've engaged in out and out power struggles or it's resulted in the quick diminution of government capacity, I think those 2 is what we're looking at. Either ... power struggles or

09:33:02:08 a reduction in government capacity but of course the centre of power in the south is Basra and Basra you have a 3 way, 4 way struggle between 3 political parties and mafia groups and I think that will only increase if British troops are withdrawn. Finally, to Paddy's point about, where does intervention stand in the aftermath of Iraq? I think you could argue that Iraq

09:33:30:24 signified the high watermark of international hubris. After the cold war, after the alleged successes of Yugoslavia and indeed, ironically now, Afghanistan, that there was a belief, not only amongst American, what should be call them, state intellectuals, but also in the large international community that the West can do anything, that the West can impose [THAT'S] on the ground. That's

09:33:57:10 now finished and I think intervention and State building is notoriously complex and generation long project and I think there now has to be a re-evaluation, a modesty, and I'd say a conservative modesty, conservative within the broader terms of Edmond Burke here not David Cameron, that ... of what can be achieved. Now any politician selling intervention in the terms that Paul Lever

09:34:25:02 is so worried about, selling intervention to the parents of soldiers who are going to have to die are bound to sell it at the highest possible level. Tony Blair in his Glasgow speech on the eve of invasion promising, a promise that he's now broken, promising a peaceful, democratic, affluent future to Iraqi population; that has to stop. Intervention at best is a temporary measure to

09:34:53:02 stop fighting and to create an arena where negotiations can take place. Intervention isn't about delivering a kind of democratic capitalist paradise for those populations. It's always going to be difficult, it's always gonna take a great deal more time and it's results, as Iraq now shows, and it's what I'm arguing for, it's results are gonna always be rough, ready and a horrendous

09:35:20:04 compromise.

09:35:21:16 **Paddy Ashdown**
And usually unsatisfactory. Thank you very much indeed Dr Dodge, I'm very grateful to you.

09:35:26:24 CUT