


5. While RWTS appreciate the effect that any delay in the programme will have on current theatres of operation and the associated political pressures thus imposed, we consider that Boscombe Down is failing in its primary role of providing the Front Line with equipment which can not only efficiently carry out the task but to do this safely!

6. RWTS has carefully monitored the progress of this trial and has put tremendous effort into ensuring that it progresses safely to provide timely CA Release recommendations. These recommendations with respect to FADEC have, to date, been ignored. Until RWTS is provided with a clear, unequivocal and realistic explanation of the faults described at references B through H, with corrective action, further Chinook HC2 flying shall not be authorized. A statement of "No Fault Found" will no longer satisfy this requirement.

7. As a trials organization, A&AE has always been keenly aware of the risks associated with operating the Chinook HC2 and has tailored sortie profiles accordingly. Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than A&AE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations until the conditions established in paragraph 6 are satisfied.



FOR THE RWTS

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Internal:

Action:

- Superintendent Of Flying Division
- Superintendent Engineering Division
- Superintendent Aircraft Dynamics Division