Iraq inquiry, live blog: 26 November

A compilation of our tweets from day three of Sir John Chilcot's Iraq inquiry, including an appearance by former British ambassador to the US Sir Christopher Meyer.

• 9:28 AM: IraqInquiryBlog In case you haven't seen the blog today's witness is Sir Christopher Meyer, Britain's Ambasssador to the USA , 1997-2003 #Iraq
• 9:29 AM: IraqInquiryBlog In case you haven't seen the blog today's witness is Sir Christopher Meyer, Britain's Ambassador to the USA , 1997-2003 #Iraq
• 9:33 AM: IraqInquiryBlog The rather grand title of today's hearings - if they ever begin, that is - is 'The Transatlantic Relationship' #Iraq
• 9:45 AM: IraqInquiryBlog The gremlins win - we're decamping into the main hall; check the blog bit.ly later today for detail of the hearing. Sorry!
• 10:04 AM: IraqInquiryBlog We're back - sorry for the delay, hacks had to be transferred from the main room once the audio was patched up. Here we go...
• 10:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer began by describing his first meetings with the news US presidential team - esp Rice and Rove - in Dec 2000
• 10:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Rice made it clear to him that they did not want President Bush to be a 'Middle East Desk Officer' like Bill Clinton - in other words,
• 10:06 AM: IraqInquiryBlog less of an international bent to the Bush presidency. That said there was still support for arming Iraqi dissident groups and 'narrowing and
• 10:07 AM: IraqInquiryBlog deepening' the sanctions policy against Iraq; it was felt Saddam had been using the existing sanctions regime against the West
• 10:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Interesting: Meyer says one shouldn't consider regime change as a purely Bush era doctrine, it was 'inherited' from the Democrats #Iraq
• 10:09 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert: How did Bush and Blair bond at the Camp David summit?
• 10:10 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: massive fear was that changing gear after Blair/Clinton to Blair/Bush might damage UK/US relationship
• 10:11 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I asked Rove & Rice whether the Blair/Clinton relationship wd be a problem. No but as for the future: by your work shall ye be known
• 10:12 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: But it was clear at Camp David they were going to get on. They had a good weekend together and so did the wives.
• 10:12 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The press conference, the 'Colgate moment', didn't do justice to the nature of the relationship that was developing
• 10:13 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I remember Rice saying Bush thought Tony was the only one he could talk to, the rest were like creatures from outer space #Iraq
• 10:14 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert: was the US Admin talking to you about removing Saddam by force? Meyer: I didn't see that emerging at all.
• 10:15 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: On the eve of 9/11 I telegrammed London to say the US Admin was running out of steam, had lost direction #Iraq
• 10:16 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Prior to 'the Great Atrocity' it looked like an Admin that had got in trouble. Iraq was simply a 'rumbling appendix' if you like
• 10:17 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: No-Fly Zones (NFZs) were causing problems - how long cd they be sustained and kept within the law, what if a pilot was shot down etc
• 10:18 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The Americans were saying, "if they shoot down one of our planes we will kick the shit out of them" - thank God it never happened
• 10:19 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: On 9/11 itself I spoke with Rice and asked who did it. She said, no doubt - it's an al-Qaeda operation But at the end of the chat...
• 10:20 AM: IraqInquiryBlog ...she said we are looking to see whether there cd possibly be any connection with Saddam Hussein. That was the first I heard it mentioned
• 10:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: That then turned into a big debate at Camp David that weekend - it was argued that there should be retaliation that included Iraq
• 10:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Blair was concerned about this, wanted a laser-like focus on AQ and Afghanistan, thought including Iraq would dilute that #Iraq
• 10:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert: Blair told Lab Party conference to the US, "We were with you at first, we will stay with you to the last." How did that come about?
• 10:23 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Blair's reputation in the US was sealed immediately after 9/11 - the first European leader to express sympathy and support for the US
• 10:24 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Rice told me she cried when she saw the Coldstream Guards playing the Stars and Stripes at changing of the guard
• 10:25 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I make no bones about it, it was a heady experience being Ambo to the USA in the backstream of this level of goodwill #Iraq
• 10:26 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: It was clear quite early that there was a poss problem in US admin between Colin Powell on 1 side, Cheney/Rumsfeld on the other
• 10:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Through the months up to the Iraq War it was clear Rice was more and more in the camp of Colin Powell's enemies #Iraq
• 10:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert: How did you brief ministers about this gulf between Admin members?
• 10:28 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Very few UK ministers merited access to Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld and Cheney.
• 10:29 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert: to what extent did US/UK policy on Iraq merge at the Crawford meeting in April 2002?
• 10:30 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: It took a while for policy to converge, for Bush to accept it wd better to go through the UN - prob to August of that year
• 10:31 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I told Blair pre-Crawford, how do you garner international support if policy becomes Iraqi regime change?
• 10:31 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: And above all I told him, and repeated it in all my reporting, focus on the aftermath. If Saddam goes, then what?
• 10:33 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I took no part in Crawford discussions - the men discussed the Intifada with advisers, then were alone on the ranch until Saturday
• 10:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: So there are clues, but no one else knows for sure what degree of convergence on Iraq took place in that meeting of the two men
• 10:35 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: When I heard the Blair speech next day I realised this was a tightening on the danger Saddam posed
• 10:35 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Blair was saying, Saddam is too dangerous, his record is too bad, doing nothing is not an option - it was a good speech
• 10:36 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Going back to before Crawford; are you saying the US attempt to get 'smart sanctions' through the UNSC wasn't a serious effort by USA?
• 10:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: No, Colin Powell took it VERY seriously - but we couldn't get round the French and Russians at the UN
• 10:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: You had to threaten Saddam with dire consequences if he subverted sanctions but offer him something if he complied...
• 10:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: ... and that would have been very difficult to sell to the US domestic audience, especially after the Iraq Liberation Act
• 10:39 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: When after 9/11 did the top US Admin settle on forcible removal of Saddam as primary objective?
• 10:40 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Once the shock of 9/11 had set in, once the Anthrax scare had been & gone - I never realised impact Anthrax had on US Administration
• 10:41 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The Admin thought Saddam could have been responsible for the anthrax letters
• 10:45 AM: IraqInquiryBlog {Apologies for the gap - PC went to blue screen of death (again) - wish C4 News used Macs...}
• 10:46 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: At what point did your instructions change from, 'We support containment' to, HMG supports regime change?
• 10:46 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I got a chunky set of instructions in March 2002 from David Manning (10 Downing St Foreign Policy adviser)
• 10:47 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I used Manning's instructions and told the US, you're big enough to do this (regime change) by your self but...
• 10:48 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: ... it's far better if you want to keep your friends and partners it's better you do it in an alliance and via the UN
• 10:49 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I had a secret meeting with Wolfowitz, details of which duly appeared in the Sunday Telegraph, laid out the policy. He was v anti-UN
• 10:50 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Iraq inquiry: the special relationship and red sock watch bit.ly
• 10:50 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Disaster: we've lost both audio and video now, in fact the committee have started spooling backwards for some reason...
• 10:51 AM: IraqInquiryBlog That should feed the conspiracy theorists... #Iraq
• 10:52 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Feed's back up, after another gap. Meyer: I didn't tell Wolfowitz 'we're with you on regime change, let's go get the bastard' ...
• 10:53 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: We didn't say that, we said let's do it cleverly, let's go to the UNSC - not least so the FCO legal objections would go away
• 10:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog {Press room running bets on how many mentions of 'DC Confidential' Sir Christopher gets in}
• 10:55 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: By end of 2002 you say containment was dead for US Admin. Did that make military action inevitable, were there other options?
• 10:56 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Are you asking at what point was war inevitable? Because that's a damned hard question. Lyne: I'm asking if there were other options
• 10:57 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I spoke with Rice in Nov 2002 - she said best thing wd be if coercive diplomacy plus troop build-up led to Saddam exile/internal coup
• 10:58 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Might've happened if we'd waited a little longer, but it didn't happen
• 10:59 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: By Autumn 2002 Bush has endorsed 'the UN route' leading to new UN resolution - just an exercise to wrongfoot Saddam, as you put it to
• 10:59 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Wolfowitz? Meyer: I had to put it to Wolfowitz in those cynical terms so he wdn't see it as a limp-wristed pitiful European lack of will
• 11:00 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I had to make it look like a 'cunning plan' to this guy
• 11:02 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: the British played some role in influencing Bush to go to the UN against the very vociferous wishes of his Vice President
• 11:02 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Bush sometimes ruled by his heart, sometimes by his head. In his heart he wanted to kick Saddam out, in his head he realised...
• 11:03 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: ... he couldn't just do that. So in Sept 2002 he told us that was what he was going to do.
• 11:04 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: So at this point, Nov 2002, US/UK policy is together on putting inspectors back into Iraq. Did US/UK aim for same target?
• 11:04 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The US knew if Saddam had Damascene conversion and revealed all even if he remained there'd hv been a sort of regime change
• 11:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: In other words it wouldn't be necessary to go to war. If Saddam'd been cleverer he cd've done things that made war impossible
• 11:06 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Think US hoped inspectors would find something and trigger war; others hoped it would lead to Saddam's disarming. #Iraq
• 11:06 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Real problem was the contingency military timetable had been decided before Blix went in with the inspectors
• 11:07 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: ... which meant military and inspection timetables couldn't be synchronised. Couldn't see how Blix cd conclude inspections by March
• 11:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: which turned UNSC Res 1441 on its head. We found ourselves scrabbling for the smoking gun - went from Saddam having to prove himself
• 11:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: innocent to us having to prove him guilty, wehich the US/UK never recovered from because there WAS no smoking gun. #Iraq
• 11:10 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I warned London that what US understands by 'exhausting the UN process' may differ from what we understand it to mean...
• 11:11 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: After 1441 there was a v brief hope war might be avoided because the UN Security Council was united against him
• 11:12 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Then came Saddam's weapons declaration on Dec 7 - and the Americans, the whole admin, said that's it: he's bull-shitting us.
• 11:12 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: They said, unless he is removed by force, unless he is toppled, this is it.
• 11:13 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: So Colin Powell was sent to the UN on Feb 5 with all his evidence - which turned out to be inadequate and incorrect - of Iraqi crimes
• 11:14 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Did the US/UK ever consider regime change via Iraqi dissidents, rather than military intervention?
• 11:15 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Regime change - the offical US policy - was sharpening sanctions and beef up the resistance groups.
• 11:16 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: In Jan 2001 even if there were hawks hanging around the Admin-in-waiting, Rice and I discussed sharpening sanctions and equipping
• 11:17 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: the Iraqi opposition. Land invasion was never on the table far as I know until the traumatic events of 9/11.
• 11:18 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: But by early 2002 regime change meant military invasion? Meyer: Yes, effectively.
• 11:18 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Post-9/11, Wolfowitz pursuing suggestions that al-Qaeda had come connection - did you discuss this with him?
• 11:19 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I had sicussions. He was quite convinced there was a strong UbL-Saddam connection. He was convinced Mohammed Atta had met Iraqi
• 11:20 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: officials in Prague. Which was apparently entirely untrue. Apparently it is rubbish, but you cdn't dig it out of the bloodstream of
• 11:20 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: influential members of the US Admin. There was another story about Saddam allowing AQ to run a camp on his border - again untrue.
• 11:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: As you know the Pentagon became so angry with the CIA they started their own in-house intel operation.
• 11:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: So you had Administration figures, Cheney and Rumself, who weren't believing what the CIA was telling them. #Iraq
• 11:23 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I made it extremely clear to the FCO that this was going on in the US. We were maybe even over-assiduous in reporting it.
• 11:24 AM: IraqInquiryBlog [Short break. 'DC Confidential' available at all good bookshops.]
• 11:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog We're back. Lyne: What were the UK's conditions for joining the US in heading towards military action?
• 11:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: We wanted violence between Israel and the Mideast wound down in some way. Plus the construction of an Iraq coalition, and the
• 11:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: exhaustion of the UN and inspection processes.
• 11:40 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: We failed miserably on winding down the Arab/Israel dispute - things almost went into reverse. The 'Route Map' led to "bugger all."
• 11:40 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The US called for Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank towns which made it easier for lair in Crawford but...
• 11:41 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: as soon as the statement went out there was a major political operation to reverse the US call for withdrawal.
• 11:42 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Powell came back from the region and found out he'd been undermined by his enemies in the Admin while he was away
• 11:42 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: We did better with the 2nd condition, the UN thing, although the devil is in the detail.
• 11:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The definition of 'exhausting the UN process' was very different between what we thought and what the US thought #Iraq
• 11:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: It was hard enough convincing the US that the UN had a role, then that there would need to be a UNSC resolution
• 11:44 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Bush's UNGA speech on 14/09/02, we didn't even know if he'd mention the resolution - to this day he may only have done so by mistake
• 11:45 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: because of a problem with his teleprompter... #Iraq
• 11:45 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: If we were the indispensable ally, couldn't we have had more traction on the US on the conditions for joining them?
• 11:46 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: As I said in my book, given the Bush/Blair relationship I think we could have been tougher - more could've been done
• 11:48 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I think Blair could've said more at Crawford but by the time you get to the end of that year it is probably too late
• 11:48 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Would sitting out the war have damaged US/UK relations?
• 11:49 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Impossible to say. We had a very good standing in the US at the time. I doubt that it would have done a lot of damage - in all my
• 11:49 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: travels I didn't find anyone in the US very keen on military action, only an oil man in Houston...
• 11:50 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: What if we'd made a smaller contribution, short of joining in?
• 11:50 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I think anything we'd have contributed would have been gratefully received
• 11:51 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: What benefits to British interests did we get by joining in with the US?
• 11:52 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Great question. I remember the popularity we had in 2002, going to baseball matches in NY and seeing the billboards welcome
• 11:52 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: the UK Ambassador - I almost needed someone sitting behind me whispering, remember you are mortal.
• 11:53 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I told London, we need to capitalise on this. And then the Americans imposed steel export tariffs on the UK on the very day that
• 11:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: 45 Commando arrived in Afghanistan. I said to Rove, what in Christ's name are you doing? He said it's just politics
• 11:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: To summarise, it wasn't essential for the defence of British interests that we took part in Iraq.
• 11:56 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: That said there was a British interest in confronting Saddam via the UN, and we should've done it in 1999
• 12:08 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I warned others in June or July that I thought our support was being assumed by DC - that whatever happens the Brits will be there
• 12:08 PM: IraqInquiryBlog -Phew- that's better, technical problems of our own. Apologies for the 10 minute gap #Iraq
• 12:10 PM: IraqInquiryBlog During the gap Meyer's moved onto plans in both the US and UK for what would happen in Afghanistan AFTER regime change
• 12:11 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: There was a meeting in DC in Jan 2003 and I think it's fair to say the British team asked the US what about the aftermath?
• 12:11 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The response was it's all in hand and that was it. That was the full extent of the exchange.
• 12:12 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Resolution 1441 was a significant diplomatic achievement but it had the seeds of its own destruction in its own ambiguity -
• 12:13 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: its ambiguity on the crucial question, what would be the trigger for war?
• 12:15 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: UK influence on the US - you set out the Crawford conditions for joining the US but they were never put before Parliament
• 12:16 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The key condition was that military processes shd be subordinate to political and diplomatic strategy
• 12:17 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: had the military planned for Autumn 2003 rather than Spring 03 a lot of things could have been unwound - but the tail wagged the dog
• 12:18 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Military timetables began to wag political and strategic policy. It should have been the other way round.
• 12:20 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: Blair came to DC in Jan 2003 and was seeking delay in the military campaign; to be fair he got the US to seek a 2nd UNSC resolution
• 12:21 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: You got the worst of both worlds, a return to the Security Council but without the time to work it all through
• 12:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: You mentioned the aftermath question came up at the Jan 21 meeting; was there any sense at all how awful it might end up being?
• 12:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: The worry at the time was that there might be a humanitarian disaster, especially if Saddam used chemical weapons
• 12:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: What disappeared from the calculations was that after Saddam was toppled you had to maintain law and order
• 12:24 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: When Baghdad was captured the division that took over didn't do anything because it didn't have any orders to do so
• 12:24 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: what drove the US decision to move in early 2003?
• 12:25 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: I don't know. It could've been a purely military planning decision.
• 12:26 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot asks about when British influence on the US would've been strongest and what the UK could've done
• 12:27 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer invokes the Iron Lady - 'What would Margaret Thatcher have done' - and concludes she would have insisted on a clear, diplo strategy
• 12:29 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer on aftermath: I remember someone from the USNSC saying to me in Jan 2003 we can't have total de-Ba'athification
• 12:29 PM: IraqInquiryBlog [The importance being that that's exactly what happened post-invasion]
• 12:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot: Did having a very powerful US Vice President make US/UK relations difficult?
• 12:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: It's very rare to have one that strong. Cheney's institutional opposite number here was the Deputy PM [John Prescott]
• 12:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Meyer: How can I put it, this was an unbalanced relationship and probably didn't reap the dividends it might have done [laughter in room]
• 12:36 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Wrapping early - Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK's man at the United Nations 1998-2003. Apologies on the Inquiry's behalf for their tech probs,
• 12:38 PM: IraqInquiryBlog and an extra helping of 'Sorry' for our own. Noticed it coincided with 400th Tweet - could that be it? #Iraq

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