Iraq inquiry, live blog: 27 November

A compilation of our tweets from day three of Sir John Chilcot's Iraq inquiry, including an appearance by former British ambassador to United Nations Sir Jeremy Greenstock.

• 9:53 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Ooh interesting, hear Greenstock's put out a witness statement - the 1st Inquiry witness to do so. Shd be on bit.ly after 10h
• 9:55 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Sounds of shuffling from the plasma screens we watch the Inquiry on, should be getting going soon #Iraq
• 10:02 AM: IraqInquiryBlog We're off. Chilcot: we want to examine UK Govt policy towards and developments within the UN pre-War
• 10:02 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot: and the establishment of UNSC resolution 1441 in Nov 2002, and failed attempts to establish a subsequent resolution in 2003 #Iraq
• 10:03 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock's written statement now online at that link I mentioned #Iraq
• 10:04 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: In 2001 Iraq was one of a number of issues before the UNSC (UN Security Council)
• 10:04 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: But Iraq goes back vis-a-vis the UNSC to 1991, 1998, resolution 1284 in 1999 - so it goes back way before 9/11
• 10:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Res 1284 was adopted in Dec 1284 establishing new inspections regime in Iraq - but 1284 wasn't accepted by Iraqi Govt
• 10:06 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: So although UNMOVIC was etablished from 2000 it couldn't get into Iraq to do its work. So the UNSC's business was containment
• 10:07 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: ... via No-Fly Zones, Oil for Foord programme, sanctions
• 10:07 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: By 2001 - at the same time the Bush administration came on the scene - Iraq containment was seen as flawed
• 10:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Iraq produced the greatest divisions among the permanent 5 members of the UNSC of any issue #Iraq
• 10:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The US was one end of the spectrum, viewing Iraq as a threat and the UN as unable to deal with the threat
• 10:09 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The UK was sympathetic to that view but wanted to see the UN operate successfully together
• 10:10 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: France, Russia & China all abstained on 1284 and weren't pro simple Iraq containment because they wanted sanctions to end
• 10:11 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Russia and France thought US was being too harsh via the UN imposing the sanctions - saw other ways of dealing with the threat
• 10:11 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Arab members saw it as being about more than WMD, about Western states taking on an Eastern or Arab enemy #Iraq
• 10:12 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Don't believe a single UNSC member thought Iraq was honestly trying to meet UNSC conditions
• 10:13 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Don't believe a single UNSC member thought Iraq was innocent, was not deying the UN, was not cheating on sanctions
• 10:18 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Another PC blue screen of death - perhaps we might consider getting some decent laptops? Apologies for gap, resuming now
• 10:20 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Russia in the summer of 2001 was the only UNSC member that opposed smart sanctions as we understood them
• 10:20 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: You'd have to ask experts on Russia like (committee member) Roderic Lyne why they did that
• 10:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Russia resented what had happened in Nov/Dec 1998, what happened in Kosovo in 1999
• 10:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Russia thought US wanted sanctions on Iraq as matter of hostility, regardless of UN backing #Iraq
• 10:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Russians weren't prepared in 2001 - with new Bush admin - to be part of recasting one-sided sanctions regime against Iraq
• 10:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Ironically Russia didn't vote for UNSC Res 1284, but they firmly backed it from 2001 onwards
• 10:28 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: could UK have done more to build on change of mood towards US after 9/11?
• 10:28 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Arguably yes - but it was not for the UK to do more than stand on the touchline, US had to build on it
• 10:29 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: It didn't happen that way because that's not how the US works. It needed to happen in DC
• 10:30 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The US works first and foremost within a domestic context - the President had to explain policy to his home audience
• 10:31 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: From the UK point of view, US didn't consider setting up a different set of global relationships
• 10:31 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: That would've made it easier for the US to do its international business with widespread support
• 10:33 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The Bush Admin sought allies only when they needed allies for a particular policy - if they cd do it on their own they would
• 10:33 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Towards end 2001 Russians signalled they might support smart sanctions. But in 2002 they went back again
• 10:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: In Feb 2002 the US went serious on getting a smart sanctions regime - had bilateral negotiations with Moscow away from the UN
• 10:35 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: moving onto 1441 UNSC negotiations - what did we seek through this resolution?
• 10:36 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The UK played a part in persuading the US admin to come to the UN. Once Bush said he'd be seeking UN resolutions, ...
• 10:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: it was our job to secure a resoluton that was relevant to our interests
• 10:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We wanted inspectors to return to Iraq to get to the bottomg of the WMD issue and make clear to Iraq it had to comply
• 10:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Were there differences between the UK/US perspectives on negotiations?
• 10:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Here we get into some quite complex issues...
• 10:39 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman interrupts: just pre-1441, what about 1409 - the US seemed to be moving towards regime change but assuring containment. Is that so?
• 10:40 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I wasn't aware as much as London was of the drum-beats going on for military preparation in the US at the time
• 10:41 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: It was natural to me to seek to extend containment - I didn't see that there was an alternative - so I welcomed resolution 1409
• 10:42 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: It wasn't until the Crawford meeting until Apr 2002 that the UK was being drawn into quite a different sort of discussion
• 10:42 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: That wasn't visible to me, nor did I have instructions to behave any differently in the UN
• 10:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I wasn't being politically naive, but I wasn't being politically informed either
• 10:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Was there any discussion around about Crawford about what this meant for your delegation?
• 10:43 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I don't recall any discussion - I don't remember being asked to give my views
• 10:44 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Were there discussions at this time re putting more pressure on temporary UNSC member Syria over smuggling into Iraq?
• 10:45 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We didn't discuss approaching Syria - the smuggling was going on through other countries too
• 10:46 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I saw it as a pity that more pressure wasn't put on all 3 - Turkey, Jordan and Syria. Was suprised and disappointed.
• 10:47 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were equivocal views in the US admin on how much effort to spend on sanctions and containment that might not do the trick
• 10:48 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Kofi Annan decided to have his own bilaterals with the Iraqis because he was worried the US might have a valid reason if ...
• 10:48 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: sanctions and containment failed to consider an alternative option.
• 10:49 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: But in the end Annan gave up the discussions as he thought the Iraqis were leading him down a track #Iraq
• 10:50 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: You say you weren't asked to give your views at the time of Crawford. Meyer told us David Manning gave him a 'new line' to take
• 10:51 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Were you consulted on that new line? Greenstock: No.
• 10:51 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: With my US counterpart we began drawing up resolution 1441 - debated to what extent we could threaten 'all necessary measures'
• 10:52 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: 'All necessary measures' is UN speak for the use of force.
• 10:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: London effectively said, hooray, Bush has come to the UN; we need a resolution covering the following elements, please give us
• 10:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: views on how this might be formed into a resolution.
• 10:55 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: During these negotations do you think the bar was set too high (by the US) for the Iraqis to comply?
• 10:55 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Not by the UK. I thought setting the bar too high wd be self-defeating - the UNSC wd reject it as being unacceptable
• 10:56 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I think US Ambo Negroponte realised as I did that what Washington wanted wasn't 100% consistent with what Bush told the UNGA
• 10:57 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar quotes Greenstock witness statement - 'I warned FCO I might have to resign if no resolution was possible'
• 10:58 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I regarded it as necessary politically and legally to have a news resolution, at least one new resolution
• 10:58 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Resolutions 678 and 687 proscribed the use of force against Iraq subject to it keeping its ceasefire with Kuwait
• 10:59 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: If 10 years on we were resurrecting the authority of 678 and 687 we had to have evidence Iraq was in breach of resolutions
• 11:01 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: US/UK wasn't challenged legally for using force in Dec 1998. I wanted the same legal certainty
• 11:02 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I wanted to be clear: if going to the UN was just a Potemkin exercise I didn't want to be part of it
• 11:02 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: So I made it clear I might not continue as UN Ambo if there wasn't ongoing reason to treat Iraq as being in material breach
• 11:05 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock defines his understanding of "legitimate" in terms of justifying war. Says he viewed UK involvement as legal but of questionable
• 11:06 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: legitimacy because it didn't have the backing of a majority of member states
• 11:07 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: So with 1441 you were trying to establish legitimacy of action against Saddam. What did 1441 mean to various UNSC members?
• 11:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We wanted as large a consensus as possible in the UNSC to establish legitimacy. So compromises were necessary.
• 11:08 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were two tortuous months of negotiations with other members.
• 11:09 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Colin Powell, who did more than anyone to get Bush to come to the UN, was prepared to compromise -
• 11:09 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: but he had people behind him in Washington who weren't prepared to compromise.
• 11:10 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The US was determined to resist the need for specific UNSC resolution that would allow the use of force. So diplomacy got clever
• 11:11 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: and it made a text in 1441 that was equivocal on what wd happen if Saddam didn't comply and who should judge that compliance
• 11:12 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: After 1441 was adopted things began to drift in 2 directions. US/UK took 1441 absolutely literally, ...
• 11:13 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: but the French and others read it as meaning only the UNSC should take a decision on the use of force
• 11:13 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We were never active enough after the enactment of 1441 to clear up that ambiguity
• 11:14 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We felt 1441 achieved the return of the inspectors [Prashar: but the bar was set too high] - a chance to settle the WMD question
• 11:15 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Wiliam Patey told us earlier this week the US didn't rate the inspection regime - so why did they agree to 1441?
• 11:17 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Sir William Patey told us earlier the US didn't rate the inspection system - so why did they go with 1441?
• 11:18 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Colin Powell wanted a consensual, effective process so if it came to it there would be international consensus on use of force
• 11:19 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: During 1441 negotiations was it your view a second resolution (approving military action) would be needed?
• 11:19 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were 2 sorts of second resolution - Bush used the plural when his teleprompter broke down, he was ad-libbing from memory
• 11:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: It was my view, my instructions, that we shd not concede as UK that a specific UNSC decision to announce military action
• 11:21 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We thought 1441 was sufficient as long as it could be made clear that Saddam was not cooperating
• 11:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: It was surprising that only the Mexican delegation said to me that only the UNSC would have the right to sanction force
• 11:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The irish said something similar, but the French & Russians were equivocal about why they voted as they did
• 11:22 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: What were the consequence of the different votes?
• 11:23 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were many consequences of 1441. France in the UK view abandoned the agreement we'd had on the 1441 compromise
• 11:25 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: France became so determined to block unilateral US military action that it insisted on a UNSC resolution first
• 11:26 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: For the UK this whole saga was about WMD. You ask me about the effect of different noises coming out of the US admin?
• 11:26 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: It was unhelpful to the policy position of the UK
• 11:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: No member of the UNSC nor Hans lix nor Mohammed el-Baradei said to me, We know the Iraqis don't have WMD
• 11:27 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: They raised questions about the level of evidence that there WERE WMDs, but that;s a different point
• 11:28 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: For instance President Chirac said to Bush in Summer 2002 that France believed Saddam was developing WMD
• 11:28 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: And I don't believe that even Moscow could say, there were definitely none
• 11:29 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I should say for public consumption, I did talk myself with the Iraqi ambassador to the UN on 20/09/02 when I laid out what the
• 11:29 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: current threat to Iraq was. He told me that Iraq had no WMDs. So I assume he'd been told to assert that by the Iraqi government
• 11:30 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: But no arm of the UK government was in a position to ascertain if that was true
• 11:31 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert asks whether the compromises within 1441 strengthened or weakened the US/UK position
• 11:32 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were compromises - but not on whether or not a second resolution would be needed.
• 11:33 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: You mention the different instructions coming from Washington - what was your relationship with London at this time?
• 11:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There was no tension between me and London - although there was tension in the air everywhere.
• 11:34 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There came a stage in early October when the French took over from the Russians [blocking the US/UK]
• 11:35 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: At no point that I remember did I disagree with London or contest my instructions from London.
• 11:36 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There was toing and froing of all sorts but I can't remember disagreements between us in NY and London to the point of tension
• 11:36 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: So why did you discuss having to consider your position?
• 11:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The noises off about regime change in Washington - London constantly argued back on the need for a resolution
• 11:37 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I decided to say if it became UK policy to go to the use of force without a UN resolution I would have personal difficulties
• 11:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Maybe I thought I shd be clear on that, maybe I thought it would serve as a stiffener
• 11:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I said it to the Permanent Secretary, Sir Michael Jay - I wasn't informed where else it went.
• 11:38 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Ten minute break - am off to call computer support............
• 11:51 AM: IraqInquiryBlog We're back. Chilcot asks what 1441 aimed to achieve, into the second resolution?
• 11:52 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were a number of considerations coming from London, there was a strong interest in the disarmament of Iraq
• 11:53 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: through means short of the use of force. Either a shift of politics in Iraq or a decision by Saddam it wasn't worth it
• 11:54 AM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We wanted a clear understanding within the UNSC of what the clear threat contained in 1441 if there was non-cooperation
• 12:08 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot: take us through the two UNMOVIC reports. Rather different in character?
• 12:09 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I think Hans Blix would contest that
• 12:09 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: On 27 January re produced the first UNMOVIC finding, which was that Iraq wasn't coopearting sufficiently
• 12:10 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Blix got cross that the US had run out to the microphone saying, This is material breach
• 12:10 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: So when it came to the second statement Blix stated that the Iraqis ARE beginning to cooperate
• 12:10 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The US was quite cross about that
• 12:11 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Revealingly in the lunch after Blix's 14 Feb report he was tougher on the Iraqis in private than he had been in public
• 12:11 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: It was clear to me the reaction of the Americans had had an affect on him [Blix]
• 12:12 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot: Efforts to get a 2nd resolution go right up to the last days - how close did we get?
• 12:12 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I never felt we got close to having 9 positive votes in the bag
• 12:12 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We got indications from the middle 6 that they were interested in an ultimatum vote
• 12:13 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: But when asked by London how many votes were certain I never reported back that I had more that 4
• 12:14 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I was never confident, and I never told London I was confident, of getting 9 votes
• 12:14 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We had statements in private from the Chinese & French that if there was a material find they might change [but there were none]
• 12:15 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Feb to March we went through 3 texts that we put forward to the UNSC
• 12:15 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We tried various formulations and weren't getting traction without further factual evidence
• 12:15 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Inside NY there were other developments, like other nations making other suggestions
• 12:16 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: On the final Sunday I was approached by the UNSC president for the month, the Guinean ambassador, saying
• 12:16 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: that the middle-ground six wanted to make another proposal
• 12:17 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: What about the timing of when the second resolution was abandoned?
• 12:18 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were two aspects - time for the inspectors to do their job, and the timing of military preparations
• 12:18 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: And the two didn't really meet. So was it possible for anyone, particularly the UK, to get more time out of the US?
• 12:19 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: And secondly what was a reasonable time for the inspectors to do their job? I had to weigh both factors.
• 12:19 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: How strong did HMG feel they would like another 6 months?
• 12:19 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Also, Meyer said the military tail was wagging th diplo dog? Greenstock: Yes of course. In the US it was.
• 12:20 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: And therefore it affected the UK too, as we'd made clear we'd support the US
• 12:21 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I still felt there was a chance of finding a smoking gun - and that's what Hans Blix felt as well
• 12:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: although as time went by his view on that changed.
• 12:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I felt the most important issue that would support us would be a new find - a smoking gun was an essential part of our strategu
• 12:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Do you think with more time military action could have been avoided?
• 12:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Possibly. But if we'd waited until October 2003 I suspect inspectors would not have found a satisfactory solution
• 12:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: and we'd still have gone to war.
• 12:24 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We could've made a raft of uses of an extra 6 months in establishing that Iraq had not been cooperating
• 12:25 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: So you really wanted diplomacy to be given a longer chance. Greenstock: Yes - I'm a diplomat
• 12:26 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: To what extent did the pursuit of the 2nd resolution for so long weaken the impact of 1441?
• 12:26 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were 2 fundamental reasons for pursuing 2nd resolution; to put international pressure on Saddam, and
• 12:27 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: to establoish an unambiguous, undsiputed legal basis for the use of force if Saddam didn't cooperate
• 12:27 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We focussed on WMD but the US focused on more than that, as you can see from US statements at the time
• 12:28 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: ie Rumsfeld saying they would go to war with or without the Brits,
• 12:28 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The Uk's decisions for taking action against Iraq were solely based on UN resolutions. The US suggested from time to time
• 12:29 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: that there were different reasons for wanting to pursue Iraq, and regime change increasingly got mentioned
• 12:30 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: 1) was there a stage where you thought a smoking gun hadn't been found because there wasn't one
• 12:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: That wasn't where I came from, I thought there was something there. I actually still believe there IS something there but it's a
• 12:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: question of what that something is now
• 12:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock repeats the example from earlier this week about the Iraqis burying aircraft in the sand; he suggests if they could do that
• 12:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog they'd easily be able to conceal smaller things
• 12:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I believed there was something somewhere, that the inspectors were beginning to piece together some very careful explanations
• 12:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: of what was left and what needed to be accounted for in the 29 suspect areas
• 12:33 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Jack Straw argued there's no point adding time to this because Iraq is not cooperating because they're so good at concealing
• 12:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: that we need to get in there and actually end the threat.
• 12:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: That was the 7 March statement by the Foreign Sec that bridged the gap between the US and UK positions
• 12:35 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Were you getting a sense of divergence of opinion between UNMOVIC and the US over what was going on?
• 12:35 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I don't think there was ever complete convergence between UNMOVIC and the US - Blix complained to me the US had been quite tough
• 12:36 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: on him.
• 12:37 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock move onto the infamous 'yellow cake' presentation by Colin Powell, which alleged Iraq had attempted to procure uranium
• 12:37 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: (Of Powell's Feb 5 presentation) He was trying too hard to establish a case for which there was no clear proof.
• 12:39 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I regarded Chirac's position as an a priori objection to what was going on which went beyond what was happening in the UNSC
• 12:39 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Chirac did rather undercut the ground we were on
• 12:40 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: What was the impact of many of the foreign ministers actually turning up at the UN in NY? Did it add to the pressure?
• 12:41 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Sometime yes, sometimes no. At one stage the French foreign sec went to the microphone after a meeting about a different subject
• 12:41 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: and started talking about Iraq - this really wound up Colin Powell and made dealings more difficult
• 12:42 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The French, the Russians in particular were absolutely determined to prevent the unilateral use of force by the US
• 12:43 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert: Blair said in a statement on March 17 that progress had been made before France's withdrawal. What progress?
• 12:43 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We felt at times progress was being made - but like a puzzle every time you got one ball in a slot another ball fell out
• 12:44 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I'm sure the PM felt that at the time - two days later he might have made a rather more diappointed statement
• 12:44 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: To what extent were UNSC members' positions influenced more by personal interests rather than the merits of the case?
• 12:46 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There were national considerations and international considerations behind UNSC members' decisions, especially France & Russia
• 12:47 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Previous witnesses have stressed the commercial interests of some UNSC members, and how that affected their decisions
• 12:48 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I didn't have first hand experience of it but read it in others' reports. Russia and France had debts relating to Iran/Iraq war
• 12:49 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: HMG made an extraordinary effort to get the 2nd resolution. What were the consequences of making that stand and not getting it for
• 12:49 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: our standing at the UN?
• 12:49 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The overall effect of our genuine attempt at diplomacy was actually quite considerable
• 12:51 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: We met UNSC members after the 2nd resolution push had been lost and and the recption was less frosty than you might expect
• 12:51 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: I understood from meeting colleagues at the UN that the UK got good deal of credit for taking diplomacy to the last stage
• 12:52 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: If the US had gone about this unilaterally, solely, there wd've been a huge division between the US and rest of the UN
• 12:53 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Had we not gone on trying to find a diplomatic answer the health of the international community might have collapsed
• 12:53 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: If we go back to 2001; sanctions were eroding, the No Fly Zones were in question, the UNSC was divided, Saddam was winning PR battle
• 12:54 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: in that context was contaainment at all realistic, could it have been reinforced some way to contain Saddam without going to war
• 12:55 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Certainly the containment would've continued to erode. The inspectors in the end would probably have failed to find WMD if they
• 12:56 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: had been given more time, but we might have come to different conclusions. But if we had just relied on containment we felt Iraq
• 12:57 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: would've continued to increase its military capacity and would've remained a threat
• 12:57 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Everyone felt that Iraq was contravening the resolutions of the UN
• 12:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Just one thing about the UN before we break.
• 12:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The UN is fundamentally a reasonable place. Put good arguments for good reasons and you get a good hearing
• 12:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: Put arguments that aren't supported by evidence, you get a poor response
• 12:59 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: There's no doubt that the UN failed for 12 years to deal with fact that they were being defied by Saddam Hussein
• 1:00 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Greenstock: The UN was being eroded by successful non-compliance by a member state just as much as we were trying to deal with WMD threats
• 1:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog That's that. We're back at 14h00 on Monday to hear from Sir David Manning, Blair's foreign policy adviser 2001-2003. Manning was, we learned
• 1:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog yesterday, key in communicating the UK's policy shift from containment to regime change to Meyer and others in 2002
• 1:04 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Me, I'm repeating the 'calm, calm' calm' mantra ahead of a meeting with ITN computer support this afternoon.
• 1:05 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Apologies for further gaps in coverage today - can only assure that they're as infuriating here in the QEII as they must be wherever you are
• 1:06 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Rant over - have a smashing weekend x

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