Goldsmith at Iraq inquiry: afternoon session

Recap all the afternoon's action with our live tweets as former attorney general Lord Goldsmith gives evidence to the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war.

• 2:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Nous sommes rentrees. Freedman asks about Goldsmith's March 7 advice - asks why it took place then.
• 2:02 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I'd actually let him know via his officials when I got back from the US on 27 March - told him there was now a reasonable case,
• 2:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: implicitly saying you should of course still try and get a 2nd UNSC resolution
• 2:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: So I felt I'd given them the green light for military action even without a 2nd resolution, if they decided that was right
• 2:04 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I was then asked to produce a written note explaining my view, which I did
• 2:05 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith explains how UNSCR 1441 came to be connected with UNSCR 678 which dated back to Gulf War 1
• 2:06 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: 678 authorised UN states to use all necessary means to uphold UNSCR660 (Iraq's removal from Kuwait) and restore int'l peace
• 2:06 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: in the area.
• 2:08 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: But UNSCR687 assumed that Iraq would be controlled by sanctions, not the threat of military force
• 2:09 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: The aim was sanctions and limited military strikes -but question by 2002 was , had that policy failed?
• 2:11 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: 1441 was stronger because it included legally recognised phrases like breach (which previous Iraq resolutions hadn't)
• 2:14 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Term 'material breach' means the other party can treat it as a ground for terminating or suspending the obligation in question,
• 2:14 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: in this case the ceasefire agreed after Gulf War 1
• 2:15 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: While WMD would've been the so-called 'smoking gun' the test was inaccurate/incomplete disclosure by Iraq? Goldsmith: Yes
• 2:17 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman runs through 1441's main clauses
• 2:18 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Para 13 warns Iraq of 'serious consequences' - we know US wanted 'all necessary means'
• 2:19 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I understood 'serious consequences' as coded language for use of force - not that obviou what else it could have meant
• 2:20 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: What sort of force? Goldsmith: Precisely the same, whether its limited or wholesale military attack - but it must be no more than
• 2:21 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: necessary and proportionate to the objective you are trying to achieve
• 2:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Difficulty is that you can imagine a situation where material breach is non-cooperation with inspections - therefore is well-
• 2:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: understood that what you'd be looking at is not a limited air strike to open up a site, this will be invasion & occupation of Iraq
• 2:24 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Yes - it's a political and military judgment, but if they believe the only way to achieve complete verifiable disarmament of Iraq
• 2:24 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: that would be justified under international law
• 2:26 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Does material breach have to be reported by UNMOVIC/IAEA? Goldsmith: No it can be done by a UN member state
• 2:27 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: So a breach of Iraq's disarmament obligations is reported - how is it assessed and how is reaction decided?
• 2:28 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Well this is the difficult question, what was meant by fore-assessments - UNSC was required to meet & consider the situation
• 2:29 PM: channel4news Apple #tablet countdown.... Steve Jobs announcement less than 4 hrs away. But will it be a threat or good for business? bit.ly
• 2:30 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: In the summary of your advice to the PM you note unclear language of 1441; need either for UNSC to assess whether Iraq is not
• 2:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: using its last chance, or that that's irrelevant because the Council is predetermined in what should be done #Iraq
• 2:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: US thought it could decide material breach and therefore didn't need a UNSCR - we took the view they did, at least to agree
• 2:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: that Iraq had materially breacher her obligations
• 2:33 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: So is material breach something U can get out of once U're in? Goldsmith: Whole point of 1441 was enabling Saddam to do just that
• 2:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Legality is a necesary condition for military action; it's not a sufficient condition. You then have to decide whether it's right
• 2:36 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: On 4 Feb PM met with Chirac - were you aware of that? Goldsmith: Maybe from the press
• 2:37 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Might've been a good time to ask where they stood on the second resolution. Goldsmith: Am sure PM would say he couldn't do that.
• 2:41 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Of course there were alternative nterpretation of UNSCR1441 - that's why I provisionally held the view I did, then became clearer
• 2:43 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: You said if member states didn't want war they shdn't have voted for 1441 - but they might not have realised what it meant?
• 2:44 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: It would have been easy for member states to say we're not prepared to vote for 1441 unless it includes word 'decision'
• 2:45 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: You mention getting Feb intel briefing - what was that? Goldsmith: Scarlett briefed me on compliance - clear advice he was giving
• 2:46 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: was there was evidence of con-cooperation, intimidation of potential interviewees and concealment & dispersal of WMD
• 2:47 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: How weighty was this evidence? Goldsmith: I didn't have resources to evaluate intelligence of that sort
• 2:47 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: That's why I wanted to be sure the PM - who did have access to all that information - was of the view there had been a failure
• 2:50 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I think I heard it said that Hans Blix & Mo. el-Baradei's mid-Feb briefing - which Freedman says was more positive towards Iraq -
• 2:50 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: had something for everyone in it. Wasn't for me to assess.
• 2:54 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: In Para 30 of your advice you say re Desert Fox in 98 and Kosovo in 99 - 'reasonably arguable' action was a somewhat lesser
• 2:54 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: standard than others you'd have liked to present?
• 2:55 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: It's about the difference between authority based on reasonable assessment that it's legal rather than knowing it was legal
• 2:56 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I was being overly cautious - I could've been stronger - when asked by armed forces & civil service I realised they deserved more
• 2:57 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: They deserved better than my saying 'there's a reasonable case' - so it was important for me to come down clearly on 1 side
• 2:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Armed Forces were saying we want an unequivocal yes or know - please, what is the Attorney General's opinion whether war is legal
• 2:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: But you're giving the Armed Forces more - without having any more intelligence
• 2:59 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I'm simply saying that I was being cautious in not going further than I needed to on 7 March, with hindsight
• 3:00 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I'm explaining my 'Yes but' case - I wanted to underline to the PM 'reasonable case' might not necessarily be won in a court case
• 3:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I was saying to PM you need to judge Iraq really has failed to take final opportunity, based on the intelligence you see
• 3:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog [Another short break]
• 3:13 PM: IraqInquiryBlog [My mole in the Inquiry room reports three or four audience members lost deep in contemplation, or - a more legal defiition - firmly asleep]
• 3:18 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Session about to resume. Main lines thusfar feel like anger more documents haven't been released, and regret he was so cautious on March 7
• 3:20 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Gilbert says he wants to ask about risks and consequences; what what did we risk acting w/out specific authorisation?
• 3:20 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: If we acted unlawfully and knew we were doing so, that would have been a very wrong thing to do
• 3:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: There was concern among servicemen & women and civil servants but MoD felt soldiers acting under orders had nothing to fear
• 3:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: But some commanders were also concerned about their position - the 1st Sea Lord took private legal advice I understand
• 3:24 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Legal action could conceivably have taken place immediately after we announced plans for action, or just after it started
• 3:25 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: It wouldn't have been possible for ICC to take proceedings on 'crime of aggression' because its definition hadn't been agreed
• 3:25 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot: And when it is defined it won't be retrospective. Goldsmith: Exactly.
• 3:27 PM: IraqInquiryBlog More Lyne. How did your legal advice evolve between March 7 and March 17. Thankfully your 13/03/03 discussion memo has already been
• 3:28 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: declassified by our ever-bountiful Government [Laughter] It reveals on the 13th you'd changed your view & thought force lawful.
• 3:29 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Why? Goldsmith: I had 2 conversations. I was presented with MoD letter calling for clear 'yes or no' answer from Chief/Defence Staff
• 3:30 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: and I also heard from a Treasury Solicitor asking the same on behalf of civil servants who assisted any conflict
• 3:30 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: They were entitled not to be sent on thinking, maybe this is or maybe it's not legal - I had to clear the decision
• 3:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I now recognised it wasn't good enough just to say there was 'a reasonable case' - reached view, better view was it WAS lawful
• 3:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I don't think there was any precedent for this. The ICC focused the minds of the armed services on their personal responsibility
• 3:33 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: So our UN difficulties made 2nd Res less & less likely - you then had to decide on Yes or No regardless
• 3:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I take full responsibility but working with the approval of my office I initially said 'reasonable case' - I then said not fair
• 3:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: How important was the 11th March meeting with Chief of Defence Staff, Cabinet Sec & PM?
• 3:35 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Actually not at all - not in comparison ith the requests from Chief of Defence and civil service
• 3:36 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Did the PM ask you to come up with your definitive decision at this meeting? I don't recall it that way. Others may have, I don't
• 3:37 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Had you decided there WASN'T legal basis it would've been seen as huge triumph for Saddam, difficult with troops deployed
• 3:37 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: What would the political implications have been. Goldsmith: Not sure I'm the person to askl. Lyne: You were a Government Minister
• 3:38 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: There must have been huge pressure on the Govt, and on you - did it weigh on you? Goldsmith: No, not at all
• 3:39 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: The Government didn't matter to me, what mattered to me was the UK as a country and the people we were sending to war
• 3:39 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Lawyers have to weigh up the arguments regardless of consequences and make decisions
• 3:40 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne discusses Goldsmith's appointments on 13/03/03, the day he announced his change of mind - meetings in HoC etc
• 3:41 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Then you met Christopher Greenwood - the only pro-revival well-known specialist in international law outside the Govt. Dod you know?
• 3:42 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I didn't know that to be the case. I wanted to make sure we were well-prepared for any future legal argument over the war
• 3:43 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: Why didn't you use FCO's Sir Michael Wood? Goldsmith: He wouldn't have argued the case in a court of law.
• 3:45 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: You then met Lord Mayhew, former Tory Attorney General - he asked my view and I told him. A useful conversation
• 3:46 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne: And then you saw Jack Straw - why? Goldsmith: Planning - for what was going to happen next - the potential we'd be taken to court
• 3:48 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I'd had weekly conversation with the shadow attorney general, he told me it was his view it was legal
• 3:49 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Lyne asks about Goldsmith's meeting on 13/3 with Baroness Morgan and Lord Falconer - see bit.ly
• 3:50 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Mail alleged the pair performed a pincer movement on Goldsmith, practically pinning him to the wall to get him on board
• 3:51 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Absolute complete and utter nonsense. Baroness Morgan, I've never seen her do anything of the sort.
• 3:52 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Lord Falconer it's true is slightly more forceable - but in any case I'd reached my conclusion that war was legal without 2nd Res
• 3:52 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Curious because 'a soruce close to' usually means the person himself - I'd neither approached the paper nor asked anyone else to
• 3:54 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman asks about the evidence Goldsmith used to justify saying that Iraq was in breach
• 3:55 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith details document he'd been shown detailing Iraqi lack of cooperation with inspectors in 29 or 39 separate areas
• 3:56 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: Why take the decision now, if UNMOVIC was making any sort of progress? Goldsmith: You're right, not a Q for a lawyer
• 3:57 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: So timing of your advice is determined by questions of diplomacy and readiness for armed forces - but your advice might've been
• 3:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: different two or three weeks later? Goldsmith: That depends what would have happened. More could have come to light.
• 3:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: If there'd been a sea-change, if Saddam had gone into exile say, why would we then need force
• 4:00 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman cites 17/3 legal advice. Goldsmith: This is not my document. This is an FCO document. It's true it was largely drafted in my office
• 4:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Statement made in the document is Iraq has not complied with its disarmament obligations as required - which I think accurate
• 4:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: You sought clarification on 14/3/03 that it was PM's unequivocal view Iraq had committed further material breaches of 1441?
• 4:04 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Yes. Had got it orally anyway, thought it was important to have it in writing
• 4:05 PM: IraqInquiryBlog [Another quick break]
• 4:11 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Back again shortly for the closing session. Think fair to say no real palpable hits thusfar, and Mail story has taken a thumping
• 4:17 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar asks if it's true that the Attorney General wanted to tell the Cabinet how finely balancved his legal advice was but Straw warned
• 4:17 PM: IraqInquiryBlog that they might leak. Goldsmith: It isn't actually. I went to Cabinet ready to answer any Qs they might have - I started reading out the
• 4:18 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: short March 17 Parliamentary Question answer and someone - don't remember who - said you don't need to do that we can read it
• 4:19 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I remember telling Cabinet there is another point of view but this is the conclusion I have reached -
• 4:19 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: and discussion of legality stopped, Cabinet moved onto discussing other areas
• 4:20 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Obviously some Cabinet members had seen the longer version of the March 7 advice. I could understand debating the legal Q with
• 4:21 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: the Attorney General might be a slightly sterile exercise
• 4:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar: Clare Short said she wrote to you about this. Goldsmith: After the event, yes. Ministerial code that Attorney General's full
• 4:22 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: advice should be disclosed when the Attorney General isn't present. I was there, I was ready to answer all the questions.
• 4:23 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: The Cabinet I'm sure knew that there were two points of view because that had been well travelled in the Press
• 4:25 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: There is consistency between my 2 advices: on 7th March I said there's a green light for military action due to 'reasonable case'
• 4:25 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: On 17th March I ws giving my considered, revised view that military action was indeed legal
• 4:26 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I received briefings re what early targets would be. Difficulty is some of the early Command & Control targets were in places
• 4:27 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: like Palaces - so there was a debate whether they were legitimate targets. There were also questions whether Saddam & his sons
• 4:28 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: were legitimate targets, whether they were legitimate military command targets or simply part of the political apparatus
• 4:29 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I became part of the War Cabinet and targeting was discussed occasionally during morning meetings. I blocked one particular
• 4:30 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: assault on one particular city, said it could not happen with British participation due to concerns about civilian population
• 4:31 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: That particular place, things happened in relation to it at a later date but that day I blocked it [Fallujah?]
• 4:32 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Prashar takes Goldsmith onto legal responsibilities of occupying powers
• 4:33 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I was concerrned that some of the things the US Admin wanted to do went beyond the powers of an occupying force
• 4:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: So we pursued UNSCR 1483 and subsequent resolutions
• 4:34 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Clare Short raised issues about what DfID could so without UN resolutions - but I don't recall being asked to advise
• 4:36 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith on treatment of detainees: I advised ECHR obligations on treatment of people applied to detainees in Iraq #Iraq
• 4:36 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: It subsequently became clear that detainees were treated using methods outlawed as far back as the Heath Govt in Ulster in 1972
• 4:37 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Can't remember when the ISG search seemed to be about to be given up - by that stage UN resoluton gave difference basis for
• 4:38 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: presence of Coalition forces in Iraq
• 4:41 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Would've been better to anticipate aftermath earlier - but UK Govt, military & civil service always get there in the end
• 4:42 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith regrets: not being able to have greater & more detailed consideration of the UNSC resolution 1441 as it was going through
• 4:44 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot asks whether Cabinet sufficiently understand significance of legal advice Attrney General provides
• 4:45 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Might've been helpful to have had War sub-Committee even before fighting broke out as forum for discuss issues like legal advice
• 4:47 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot: Wilmshurst felt bound to resign from the FCO - could it ever get too difficult for the Att Gen to give advice, and therefore resign
• 4:47 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: No - cannot be the job of a lawyer to decide that you can't decide to give advice. Chilcot: But if Govt ignored your advice?
• 4:48 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Ah well if Govt had ignored advice that war was illegal that would create a huge constitutional crisis, and Att Gen might resign
• 4:49 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I wasn't persuaded by the recent Dutch Inquiry report on that country's involvement in war - don't think they paid enough
• 4:49 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: attention to context in which 1441 was passed.
• 4:51 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: You said if countries weren't happy 1441 they didn't have to vote for it - but your view immedately after 1441 was pro 2nd Resln
• 4:51 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: You changed your mind after intensive decisions with key players other countries didn't have access to
• 4:52 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Sorry Freedman: You changed your mind after intensive decisions with key players other countries didn't have access to
• 4:52 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Freedman: So was it really unreasonable for them to stick by their belief in 2nd resolution, the view you originally held?
• 4:54 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: 1441 simply does not say there has to be a decision - the US would never have conceded that - it was clear to everyone
• 4:56 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: Was this a difficult issue on which there were different views? Of course - we wouldn't be here today otherwise.
• 4:57 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Chilcot enters the final straights, invites comments on lessons learned. Goldsmith: whether structure of UN is effective as it should be
• 4:57 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: to deal with key questions of international peace and security. Secondly; degree of formality and discipline in way we get to
• 4:58 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Cabinet conclusions, perhaps the sub-Committee I mentioned. Thirdly some elements of greater legal planning.
• 4:59 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I've had criticisms of my integrity and professional judgment but today, with a tribunal, I've had the opportunity to
• 4:59 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: deal with those questions, explain the events and my part in them. Whether military intervention as a matter of policy was right,
• 5:00 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: I don't think it's for me to judge. But IU stand by the legal opinion I reached independently in March 2003 having considered
• 5:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Goldsmith: all the arguments and the evidence and on the basis of which I have given legal evidence as a professional lawyer for 35+ years.
• 5:01 PM: IraqInquiryBlog And so with that fighting talk the stage is set for Friday's witness Tony Blair. No evidence tomorrow, perhaps to allow the QEII and
• 5:02 PM: IraqInquiryBlog security staff time to prepare for what will undoubtedly be a huge day for all concerned.
• 5:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog Set alarm clocks early: evidence and Live Tweets back from 09h30.
• 5:03 PM: IraqInquiryBlog [Off to hold the fingers under a tap gain]

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