Afghanistan: a Taliban deal will not end the bloodshed

Sangin dominates the crossroads of the Helmand River and Upper Sangin valleys, commanding key routes for drugs and arms smuggling and insurgent movement. It is the centre of Afghanistan’s greatest area of opium production. Its tribal patterns and their dynamics project a heavy influence on the population well beyond the boundaries of town and district. And, with over 100 British and now many American soldiers killed there, Sangin has become an icon of the insurgency.

That is why the Taliban and other extremist and criminal gangs have fought so hard to deny security, stability and the rule of law in the town. That is why – peace-deal or no – heavy fighting will continue to be a feature in Sangin. Indeed, insurgent attacks have continued in and around the town since an accommodation was struck on 1 December by ISAF, Governor Ghulab Mangal, the Afghan National Security Forces and tribal leaders. Just this week, an ISAF airstrike wiped out an insurgent attack team preparing a strike against one of the combat outposts near Sangin.

Nevertheless, like General Richard Mills, commanding general of ISAF Regional Command Southwest, I am cautiously optimistic about this agreement, which seeks to achieve some of the security improvements in Sangin that have been gained elsewhere in Helmand, with knock-on benefit for reconstruction and economic development.

Cease fire

Under the deal, seven ‘Taliban’ commanders have on paper agreed to cease attacks against ISAF and Afghan government forces and to expel foreign fighters. In exchange, Afghan forces are to lead searches of dwellings in the area, and all patrols are to be jointly conducted by ISAF and local security forces – a formula that anyway has proved to work greatly to our forces’ advantage.

It is a sign of progress in this most embattled heart of the Afghan insurgency that has seen so little progress before.

General Mills has made it completely clear that this arrangement does not represent a ceasefire, and that his troops will continue to respond in force to any hostile action, and to push into and clear areas not at present under their control.

The deal may well prove to have no meaningful effect on the ground. It may not last long. It may represent a tactical or money-making ploy by local chiefs and insurgent leaders. It will certainly be viciously opposed by the Taliban. But it is at least a sign of progress in this most embattled heart of the Afghan insurgency that has seen so little progress before.

Getting to this position, precarious and uncertain though it may be, is the result of the US troop surge as well as the steady build-up of increasingly capable Afghan forces. British troops struggled bravely for too long with too few resources. They defeated the Taliban – in Sangin and everywhere else – in every tactical battle. But they lacked the resources to achieve anything but the most tentative security in the toughest areas of Helmand.

Special Forces

The massive increase in force levels has enabled security to spread and take a firmer hold – but at considerable blood price. Though there is a long way to go, the troop surge has given greater confidence to many Afghans – confidence that ISAF and the local forces are able to stick around and protect them against the depredations of the Taliban, who are responsible for the killing and torture of so many civilians in the country.

Among other signs of this increasing confidence is the apparent upturn in the number of intelligence tips given by local people to ISAF and Afghan forces. Such information is vital to counter-insurgency operations. It has enabled Coalition forces to seize and destroy numerous arms caches, to interdict improvised explosive device attack teams, often in the act of planting bombs, and to target key insurgent leaders.

For months now, Special Forces from the UK, US and other ISAF nations have been operating in the insurgent heartlands on an industrial scale. Night after night, Taliban and Haqqani network leaders are captured and killed. Many insurgent commanders – content to dispatch hapless, drug-fuelled and brainwashed suicide attackers to their deaths – prefer to raise their own hands and go quietly when ISAF come to call. They know that resistance will almost certainly lead to death.

The physical and psychological damage being done now to the Afghan insurgency by these large-scale and incredibly effective operations must be enormous. Leaders are replaced, and the replacements are then targeted. And then their replacements. As networks look further down the food-chain for new leaders, the quality and experience inevitably diminishes.

Pakistan remains a safe haven for Taliban and Haqqani insurgents.

Intelligence shows signs that some cells are having difficulty persuading their fighters to step up to command positions – self-preservation becomes the priority over the honour of jihad leadership. To stiffen the resolve of some of these local insurgent groups, al-Qaeda terrorists have arrived on the scene, themselves now operating in a quasi special forces role.

Fragile deal

There is much to be encouraged about, and the putative peace-deal in Sangin may well represent the beginning of the next development. I have no doubt that the Coalition will increase their dominance over the Taliban on the ground as we move through the New Year. But the valiant and determined work of our armed forces alone will not defeat this insurgency. There are two even greater challenges for 2011 – and beyond.

President Obama has promised to put greater effort into political progress in Afghanistan this year. The development of a government that is capable of running the country, managing the campaign and commanding the support of the majority of the people is our single most important counter-insurgency objective. That is a herculean task and there is no sign yet of it coming even close to reality.

Pakistan remains a safe haven for Taliban and Haqqani insurgents. Worse, elements of the Pakistani Army and Inter Service Intelligence Directorate continue to provide direction, training and materiel support to insurgents operating across the border into Afghanistan. While they retain this sanctuary and this support, the insurgents cannot be defeated.

Colonel Richard Kemp is the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan and author of Attack State Red, an account of combat in Afghanistan. Follow him on Twitter @ColRichardKemp.