Slaughter by timetable
The plan (2)
Artillery bombardment continued
Why this tactic failed
The first reason is that Rawlinson did not have enough artillery, and by spreading it all along the front he further weakened its strength. During the bombardment, each 1,000 square metres (1,200 square yeards) of German territory received an average of 30 shells, and each 10 square metres (12 square yards) only a pound of high explosive. His critics suggest that he would have been better off concentrating his artillery in a couple of German sectors, but this might merely have alerted them to where the British planned to attack.
The second reason for the artillery failure was that the British gunners were not as good as their French counterparts. Although they fired thousands of rounds, their aim was poor; and certainly they were not helped by the fact that most of their high explosive shells were made in such a hurry in Britain's wartime factories that as many as a third were duds.
Around 150,000 shells were fired by the British artillery every day during the battle
Imperial War Museum (Q4090)
Enlarge
image
Technically speaking, the use of shrapnel to cut barbed wire needs extremely sophisticated gunnery skills, which were not available. Most British shells were unable to penetrate German dugouts, which were 10-12 metres (11-13 yards) underground and therefore immune to the high-explosive shells of the day. These shells had to have very thick casings to endure the stresses of being fired, which left little room for explosive. This is why aerial bombing became popular after the First World War – shells dropped from airplanes don't need thick casings and can thus pack in more high-explosive.
Infantry attack
Rawlinson's choices for infantry battle tactics were dominated by his prejudice against the Pals batallions. Because, after two years of fierce fighting, most of the regular British soldiers had been lost, the volunteer pals were essential manpower. But, thought Rawlinson, because they were inexperienced in war, not much could be expected from them.
This was also a class issue – Rawlinson believed that working-class youth had to be given simple instructions or they would not be able to carry them out. At the time, French soldiers were experienced in rushing forward in small groups, one unit supporting the other with constant fire, which kept defenders' heads down. But Rawlinson thought that these tactics were too sophisticated for the Pals boys to learn.
So Rawlinson created a simple plan. He insisted that at Zero Hour the British soldiers had to climb out of their trenches, pass through prepared channels in their own barbed wire, walk across No Man's Land in regular lines, and then occupy the German trenches.
Supporting troops following the first line of attack at the
Battle of Morval, 25 September 1916
Imperial War Museum (Q1312)
Enlarge
image
Why this tactic failed
Because he expected the artillery to have destroyed the German defences, he thought it was feasible to make the infantry walk, standing upright, in straight lines, with 5 metres (5.5 yards) between each man and 100 metres (110 yards) between each wave. His critics point out that it would have been better to let the soldiers crawl as near as possible to the German lines, and then let them rush their trenches the minute the artillery bombardment stopped.
The young soldiers also had to carry some 60-70lbs (about 32kg, or the maximum check-in allowance for many of today's airlines) of equipment in a huge rucksack on their backs. This included 200 rounds of ammunition, grenades, wire cutters, a smoke helmet, pick and shovel, empty sandbags and two days' supply of food. Some had to carry special equipment such as coils of barbed wire and fence posts (to create new defences on captured ground) or field telephones (to communicate with their trenches). In the event, the soldiers didn't need much of this equipment and the load slowed them down.
Cavalry charge
Why this tactic failed – before it even began
On the First Day on the Somme, the massacre of the young British soldiers brought the British attack grinding to a halt, so there was no chance of letting the cavalry break through into open ground and rout the Germans.
Where the attack had been successful, the infantry expected the cavalry to arrive, but it didn't. With typical rigidity, old Rawlinson held back, waiting for the infantry to capture all of its allotted goals. The soldiers saw this inflexibility as a wasted chance because, where they had been successful, they could see the open country stretched out in front of them.
Although horses were used to move guns and supplies, the cavalry played a very limited role in the battle. Later, on 15 September, the British army used tanks for the first time, and the days of the cavalry regiments were numbered.