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What went wrong in 1998?
The Bureau
of Meteorology report
In its preliminary
report about the weather forecasting service before and during the race,
the Australian Bureau of Meteorology concluded that the possibility of
hazardous conditions had been conveyed to both organisers and competitors
two days before the race, on 24 December.
It had also
issued a storm warning over the phone to 'key authorities' just over one
hour into the race. (A 'storm warning' indicates an average wind speed
of 45-55 knots/40-50mph, with gusts up to 70 knots/60mph, plus wave heights
of 4-7 metres/13-23 feet, occasionally rising to 13m/43ft.) Reports from
yachts involved in the disaster suggested that these warnings only marginally
underestimated the storm, the BOM said.
The Cruising
Yacht Club enquiry
Following
an investigation, the race review committee of Australia's Cruising Yacht
Club, which had been the organiser of the disastrous Sydney-to-Hobart
race, concluded that:
- The decision
to race should remain with skippers of the boats.
- Competitors
saw no need for 'wide-sweeping' changes to safety regulations and equipment.
- 'Exceptional'
waves had caused most of the damage.
- The Bureau
of Meteorology had not accurately forecast the precise location and
timing of the low-pressure system. It had also assumed that the sailors
knew to expect winds 40% stronger and waves 86% bigger than had been
forecast when, in fact, the sailors didn't.
- No particular
yacht size or type had fared worse than any other.
- Many of
the crews had been inadequately informed about the use of safety equipment
and search-and-rescue techniques.
- The club
had not pursued training and education issues rigorously enough in the
wake of the 1993 race, when two yachts had sunk and 64 others had had
to retire damaged.
The committee
decided that no one cause was responsible for the disastrous events, but
did recommend a series of reforms:
- A weather
forecaster should be added to the Hobart race control centre to issue
specific 'layman's' information to the fleet.
- Competitors
should be obliged to report winds above 40 knots (35mph).
- Each skipper
should report, at a certain stage of the race, his or her boat's ability
to continue in light of weather warnings.
- Crews
should be more experienced, with no under-18s.
- There
should be qualifying races for new boats.
- 30% of
each crew should attend weather and safety seminars.
- There
should be more accurate position-indicating beacons. Personal strobes
or high-density lights and dye markers should be carried, as well as
hand-held VHF radios.
- The club
should scrutinise each entry more carefully with regard to seaworthiness
and crew experience.
- The race
organisers' communication gear should be upgraded.
New South
Wales coroner's inquest into the deaths
The inquest
by the New South Wales coroner finished hearing evidence on 13 September
2000. The results are expected before the next race. Check out the Sydney
Morning Herald
website, which has up-to-the-minute news about the inquest, as
well as a full archive about the tragedy.
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